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Article 7

REFORMULATING CHURCH AUTONOMY: HOW
EMPLOYMENT DIVISION v. SMITH PROVIDES A
FRAMEWORK FOR FIXING THE NEUTRAL
PRINCIPLES APPROACH
Andrew Soukup*
INTRODUCTION

Gordon Hensley began working for Newport Church of the Nazarene in 1993 as a youth minister.' Eight months later, the church
fired Hensley because he disrupted staff cohesiveness and lost the support of church members. 2 After his termination, Hensley filed a claim
for unemployment benefits. 3 When the Employment Appeals Board
granted his request for benefits, Newport Church challenged the
application of the benefits law as an unconstitutional intrusion into its
autonomy under the First Amendment. 4 The Oregon Supreme Court
rejected the church's argument, concluding that because the unemployment law was neutral and generally applicable, the court could
* Candidate forJuris Doctor, Notre Dame Law School, 2008; B.A., University of
Notre Dame, 2004. 1 would like to thank Professor Richard W. Garnett for his
invaluable guidance during the planning stages of this Note and for his helpful
comments during the writing process, and Professor Paul Horwitz for his useful
suggestions on an earlier draft. I am also grateful for the members of the Notre Dame
Law Review for the effort they expended in diligently preparing this piece for
publication. Most of all, thank you to my family for their unconditional love and
support throughout my life.
1 Newport Church of the Nazarene v. Hensley, 56 P.3d 386, 388 (Or. 2002).
2 Newport Church of the Nazarene v. Hensley, 983 P.2d 1072, 1074 (Or. Ct.
App. 1999), aff d in part and rev'd in part, 56 P.3d 386. The church did not initially
challenge the Employment Appeals Board's finding that the decision to terminate
employment was based on misconduct. See Newport Church, 56 P.3d at 393 n.7. If it
had, the church would have been excused under Oregon law from paying unemployment benefits. See Newport Church, 983 P.2d at 1075. When it attempted to do so at a
later stage in the litigation, the motion was denied. See Newport Church, 56 P.3d at 393
n.7.
3 Newport Church, 56 P.3d at 388.
4 Id. at 388, 392.
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Religious organizations like Newport Church of the Nazarene
increasingly rely on the church autonomy doctrine to defend themselves from government regulation and private party litigation. Under
the doctrine of church autonomy, 6 which draws its strength from the
First Amendment, 7 courts may not review "internal church disputes
involving matters of faith, doctrine, church governance, and polity."8
However, courts may adjudicate disputes involving ecclesiastical entities using so-called neutral principles of law, provided courts ignore
doctrinal controversies as they apply those principles. 9 Although the
phrase "church autonomy"10 has appeared only twice in the U.S.
Reports-and each appearance consisted of a title of an academic article in a citation' '-religious organizations have sought the doctrine's
protection in a multitude of contexts. Churches have relied on the
doctrine in disputes over civil rights,1 2 negligent hiring, supervision,
and retention,1 3 breach of contract,' 4 tortious interference with busi5 Id. at 392-94.
6 Professor Douglas Laycock is widely credited with popularizing this phrase in
his influential article, Towards a General Theory of the Religion Clauses: The Case of Church
Labor Relations and the Right to Church Autonomy, 81 COLUM. L. REv. 1373 (1981).
7

See infra note 62.

8 Bryce v. Episcopal Church in the Diocese of Colo., 289 F.3d 648, 655 (10th Cir.
2002); see, e.g., Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595, 603 (1979); Presbyterian Church v. Mary
Elizabeth Blue Hull Mem'l Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. 440, 449 (1969).
9 See Jones, 443 U.S. at 602; see also Carl H. Esbeck, Dissent and Disestablishment:
The Church-State Settlement in the Early American Republic, 2004 BYU L. REv. 1385, 1589
("The First Amendment, with its doctrine of church autonomy, is a recognition ...
that the civil courts have no subject matter jurisdiction over the internal affairs of
religious organizations.").
10 For the purposes of this Note, the phrases "church autonomy" and "the church
autonomy doctrine" have different meanings. See infra text accompanying notes
37-48.
11 Corp. of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day
Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 341-42 (1987) (Brennan, J., concurring) (quoting Laycock, supra note 6, at 1389); Jones, 443 U.S. at 620 (Powell, J., dissenting) (citing Paul
G. Kauper, Church Autonomy and the First Amendment: The Presbyterian Church Case, in
CHURCH AND STATE 67, 90-92, 97-98 (Philip B. Kurland ed., 1975)).
12 See, e.g., EEOC v. Roman Catholic Diocese of Raleigh, 213 F.3d 795, 800-05
(4th Cir. 2000); Smith v. Raleigh Dist. of the N.C. Conference of the United Methodist Church, 63 F. Supp. 2d 694, 702-15 (E.D.N.C. 1999).
13 See, e.g., Malicki v. Doe, 814 So. 2d 347, 354-57 (Fla. 2002); Roman Catholic
Diocese of Jackson v. Morrison, 905 So. 2d 1213, 1235-38 (Miss. 2005); Gibson v.
Brewer, 952 S.W.2d 239, 246-48 (Mo. 1997) (en banc).
14 See Gabriel v. Immanuel Evangelical Lutheran Church, Inc., 640 N.E.2d 681,
683-84 (I11.App. Ct. 1994); McKelvey v. Pierce, 800 A.2d 840, 856-59 (N.J. 2002).
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15
clergy malpractice, collective
ness relationships, civil conspiracy,
18 sexual harassment, 19 negligent infliction of emotional
22
bargaining,
2 1 and various procedural issues.
20 premises liability,
distress,
set forth church autonomy
Despite the ease with which courts
a myriad of practical and doctrinal
principles, the doctrine creates
that
the Supreme Court has ruled
problems. In the practical context,
uses
church autonomy as this Note
courts can constitutionally burden
2
the degree of permissible interferthe term, 3 but it never defined
of
proven institutionally incapable
ence. Consequently, courts have
infringement
and impermissible
drawing a line separating permissible
2 4 Defining what
organization.
on the internal affairs of a religious
with religion is an inherently
26
constitutes impermissible entanglement
aptly illus25 Newport Church of the Nazarene v. HenslWy
task.
difficult

Bend Diocese, Inc., 796 N.E.2d 286,
15 See Brazauskas v. Fort Wayne-South
293-94 (Ind. 2003).
(Mass. 2002).
of Mass., 773 N.E.2d 929, 934-39
16 See Hiles v. Episcopal Diocese
see also infra
1996);
913 S.W.2d 761, 767 (Ark.
17 See, e.g., Cherepski v. Walker,
clergy malto
approaches
text (examining courts'
notes 254-55 and accompanying
practice claims).
the Infant Jesus
Teachers Org. v. St. Teresa of
18 See S. Jersey Catholic Sch.
709, 723 (N.J. 1997).
Church Elementary Sch., 696 A.2d
648,
in the Diocese of Colo., 289 F.3d
19 See, e.g., Bryce v. Episcopal Church
940,
F.3d
196
Jesus,
of
Soc'y
the
Province of
655-59 (10th Cir. 2002); Bollard v. Cal.
945-48 (9th Cir. 1999).
2004 WL
Presbytery, No. Civ.A. 03-2150-KHV,
20 See, e.g., Dolquist v. Heartland
74318, at *4 (D. Kan. Jan. 15, 2004).
(Mich.
Life Fellowship, 614 N.W.2d 88, 102
21 Cf, e.g., Stitt v. Holland Abundant
licensee
a
was
bible study on church premises
2000) (holding that a person attending
the First Amendment).
considering
without
2004
for purposes of a duty of care
Presbytery, No. Civ.A. 03-2150-KHV-DJW,
22 See, e.g., Dolquist v. Heartland
members
of church
9, 2004) (permitting deposition
WL 624962, at *2 (D. Kan. Mar.
v. Campobello, 810
People
secular);
was
discovered
when information sought to be
criminal investigain
2004) (enforcing a subpoena
N.E.2d 307, 665-67 (111. App. Ct.
278-79 (Mass.
272,
N.E.2d
808
v. Commonwealth,
tion); Soc'y of Jesus of New Eng.
a criminal investigation).
2004) (enforcing a subpoena in
affairs of a
autonomy with reference to the internal
church
defines
Note
23 This
define
others
contrast,
By
nonreligious aspects.
religious institution, even decidedly
group activity.
religious
protected
of constitutionally
church autonomy as the sphere
ultimately seek to
semantics, as both approaches
of
one
mostly
is
The difference
interference.
are immune from government
definition
define which religious group activities
Note's
this
under
only means that
The primary difference in terminology
action that falls
an
37-40,
notes
accompanying
proof church autonomy, see infra text
might not be entitled to constitutional
autonomy
church
of
within the definition
under other approaches.
tection; such a result is impossible
text.
accompanying
and
24 See infra notes 122-26
discussed below, infra Part I.B,
approaches
conflicting
and
25 The contradictory
of scholars have
resolving this inquiry. A plethora
illustrate the intrinsic difficulty in
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trates the difficulty of determining when the government unconstitutionally interferes with church autonomy. The church argued that the
unemployment law threatened its institutional autonomy in two ways:
first, if it was required to disclose and justify its reasons for firing a
religious leader, it might not terminate the minister; and second, the
burden imposed by paying unemployment benefits might cause the
church to refrain from firing a minister. 27 The law imposed a burden
on the church-minister relationship, which has historically enjoyed
special protection, 2 but the Oregon Supreme Court held that requiring churches to pay unemployment benefits to ministers did not vio29
late the doctrine of church autonomy.
Similarly, in the doctrinal context, some have questioned the viability of the church autonomy doctrine following Employment Division
v. Smith.3 0 In Smith, the Supreme Court held that neutral, generally
applicable laws that incidentally burden the religious conduct of individuals do not violate the Free Exercise Clause. 3 ' Supporters of a
broad right to church autonomy thus struggle to answer how religious
groups can claim that they are exempt from generally applicable laws
when individuals lack the same immunity. 2 Indeed, Newport Church
rested its decision in part on the fact that the principles of Smith
33
defeated the church's claim to autonomy.

already attempted to address the proper scope of the church autonomy doctrine. See,
e.g., Symposium, Church Autonomy Conference, 2004 BYU L. REv. 1093; see also Gerard V.
Bradley, Church Autonomy in the Constitutional Order: The End of Church and State?, 49
LA. L. REv. 1057 (1989) (arguing for an increase in religious-based political discussion
to prevent neutral principles from infringing upon church autonomy); Laycock, supra
note 6, at 1397 (calling for a broad right of church autonomy that "extends to all
aspects of church autonomy"); Ira C. Lupu & Robert Tuttle, The Distinctive Place of
Religious Entities in Our Constitutional Order, 47 VitL. L. REv. 37 (2002) (examining
different perspectives to evaluate the best method for protecting religious freedom).
26 56 P.3d 386 (Or. 2002).
27 Id. at 393.
28 See infra Part III.C.
29 Newport Church, 56 P,3d at 394.
30 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
31 Id. at 882-90.
32 See Kathleen A. Brady, Religious Organizations and Free Exercise: The Surprising
Lessons of Smith, 2004 BYU L. REv. 1633, 1635; Perry Dane, "Omalous" Autonomy, 2004
BYU L. REV. 1715, 1715-16; Laura S. Underkuffler, Thoughts on Smith and ReligiousGroup Autonomy, 2004 BYU L. REv. 1773, 1774.
33 Newport Church, 56 P.3d at 392-93. But see, e.g., Bryce v. Episcopal Church in
the Diocese of Colo., 289 F.3d 648, 656 (10th Cir. 2002) (concluding that the church
autonomy doctrine remains viable after Smith because those cases "address[ I the
rights of the church, not the rights of individuals").
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This Note seeks to resolve these practical and doctrinal difficulties by providing courts with a meaningful framework for applying the
church autonomy doctrine. This framework reconciles the principles
elucidated in Smith with historical and precedential evidence favoring
34
constitutional protection for some aspects of church autonomy.
Under this framework, courts must first determine whether the applicable rule of decision in a dispute involving a religious organization is
a neutral principle of law, which the Supreme Court has defined in a
similar context as a rule that does not target beliefs or restrict religious practices purely because of their religious quality. 35 If such a

principle exists, courts should presume they can resolve the dispute
without unconstitutionally interfering with the internal affairs of a
church. Religious entities can rebut that presumption by showing that
government action interferes with one of three constitutionally protected spheres of autonomy presently supported by Supreme Court
precedent. Based on historical influences and the guiding principles
of Smith, the church autonomy doctrine avoids the constitutional
problems associated with religious-based exemptions for individual
conduct and remains consistent with historical attitudes toward religious organizations if it defines spheres where religious activity is protected instead of creating specific religious-based exemptions.
Part I explains how courts, based on the guidance of the Supreme
Court, abandoned their historical approach of declining jurisdiction
in cases involving religious disputes as they embraced the belief that
they could adjudicate such disputes by applying neutral principles of
law. However, this jurisprudential shift created an unworkable and
inconsistent case-by-case approach, showing why the Supreme Court
initially adopted bright-line rules against government involvement in
church affairs. Part II argues that historical attitudes toward religious
groups and First Amendment principles announced in Smith suggest
courts should abandon the case-by-case method in favor of a broad
presumption that assumes courts can always adjudicate disputes
involving religious organizations without violating the First Amendment. Part III suggests that religious organizations can rebut the
34 Some might argue that "church autonomy" only encompasses constitutionally
protected activity, see supra note 23, but this Note defines this term more broadly for
purely semantic reasons. For the sake of clarity, the aforementioned definition of
church autonomy is consistent with what this Note calls "constitutionally protected
spheres of church autonomy." See infra Part Il.
35 See Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 533
(1993); see also infra text accompanying notes 175-80 (explaining how the Court's
definition of neutral laws of general applicability in Lukumi Babalu can also apply in
the church autonomy context).

..

1684

NO T KA

*O~'
L

I AwM
W

ui~vI1W

[VOL. 82:4

REVIEW

that the government action
aforementioned presumption by showing
defined spheres of autonomous
infringes upon one of three narrowly
previously established: dogma,
conduct that the Supreme Court
relationship. For those who fear
authority, and the church-minister
freedom, Part IV illustrates
this framework fails to protect religious
and the democratic process also
how other constitutional provisions
autonomy. While neither
adequately safeguard religious group
as well as the robust church
approach protects institutional autonomy
36
commentators, as a practical
autonomy doctrine espoused by some
exemptions for religious
matter, legislatures eagerly grant numerous
religious institutions
groups from a variety of laws. Consequently,
affairs from governinternal
have sufficient means for preserving their
for courts to determine that
ment interference, making it unnecessary
deserve constitutional protection
new spheres of church activities
under the church autonomy doctrine.
I.

THE

AUTONOMY DOCTRINE
ORIGINS OF THE CHURCH

autonomy doctrine" do not
"Church autonomy" and the "church
refers to the idea that a
mean the same thing. Church autonomy
its polity, faith, doctrine,
religious institution should3 7have control over
depends for its recognition
and other internal affairs. The principle
to "'decide for themselves, free
upon a fundamental right of churches
of church government as well as those
from state interference, matters
38 The Supreme Court has never used the
of faith and doctrine.'
to describe its jurispruphrase "church autonomy" in its opinions
of free exercise protection in
dence, 39 nor has it addressed the extent
Smith. Almost any government
the context of religious groups since
church autonomy to some
action, if applied to churches, can impact
in Newport Church, from the
extent. For example, the law at issue
a church must make to its
church's perspective, governed payments
40 The law certainly implicated
employees if it decided to fire them.
the church's decision to fire an
church government, for it influenced
doctrine by affecting the churchemployee. It also implicated church
unemployment law, the church
minister relationship. Without the
benefits into account; with the
need not take the decision to pay
broad conceptions of church autonomy).
36 See infra note 127 (discussing
protected
("[C]hurches have a constitutionally
37 Laycock, supra note 6, at 1373
interference.").
government
of
free
interest in managing their own institutions
(quoting
83 F.3d 455, 462 (D.C. Cir. 1996)
Am.,
of
Univ.
Catholic
v.
38 EEOC
344 U.S. 94, 116 (1952)).
Kedroff v. Saint Nicholas Cathedral,
the Public
Institutions, the No-Harm Doctrine, and
Religious
39 Marci A. Hamilton,
Good, 2004 BYU L. REV. 1099, 1112-13.
v. Hensley, 56 P.3d 386, 393 (Or. 2002).
40 Newport Church of the Nazarene
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unemployment law, the church knew that a decision to terminate an
employee carried a corresponding duty imposed by state law to pay
benefits to the employee. In the strictest sense of the word, then, the
unemployment law burdened Newport Church of the Nazarene's
autonomy.
By contrast, the church autonomy doctrine determines the
degree to which the government may constitutionally intrude upon
church autonomy. For a legislative body, the church autonomy doctrine provides the standard against which otherwise neutral, generally
applicable laws are evaluated. 41 For a court, the church autonomy
doctrine establishes a guideline for determining when a court must
refrain from exercising full-fledged jurisdiction to avoid violating the
First Amendment. 4 2 The church autonomy doctrine is distinguishable from other religion based constitutional protections because it
requires no balancing of the relative interests of a religious organization and the state. 43 For example, an analysis under the Free Exercise
Clause requires a compelling governmental interest and least-restrictive-means inquiry. 44 Similarly, the Establishment Clause directs
courts to look at the secular purpose and primary effect test.45 In the
context of the church autonomy doctrine, however,
a balancing test is [not] appropriate to determine to what extent
judicial scrutiny of [the plaintiffs] claims would offend the defendants' religious freedoms under either the establishment clause, or
the free exercise clause of the First Amendment. The application of
First Amendment principles, in circumstances such as these,
involves no balancing test. If adjudication of the plaintiffs claims
would implicate matters of ecclesiastical relationships, the courts
46
should not intrude.

Notwithstanding the arguments in favor of a broad right to
church autonomy, the Supreme Court has indicated that some interference with the internal affairs of a church is constitutional. 47 Thus,
41
42
43

See, e.g., Kedroff 344 U.S. at 110.
See, e.g., Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595, 602-07 (1979).
L. Martin Nussbaum, Watson v. Jones and the Doctrine of Church Autonomy, THE
ROTHGERBER JOHNSON & LYONS RELIGIOUS LIBERTY ARcHiVr, Apr. 2003, http://www.
churchstatelaw.com/commentaries/watsonvjones.asp.
44 See Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 546
(1993); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 406 (1963).
45 See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971).
46 Williams v. Episcopal Diocese of Mass., 766 N.E.2d 820, 825 (Mass. 2002) (citations omitted).
47 Cf.Jones, 443 U.S. at 605 (holding that courts do not have to defer to religious
factions in all cases); Underkuffler, supra note 32, at 1787 ("[Granting religious
groups sweeping freedom from civil laws carries with it far more costs than benefits.").
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while church autonomy refers to the right of a church to manage its
internal affairs independent of any government interference, the
church autonomy doctrine describes the inquiry courts undertake to
determine the scope of constitutionally permissible government inter48
ference with those affairs.
A.

Watson v. Jones 4 9 and its Progeny

The church autonomy doctrine is derived from a line of intrachurch disputes in which the Court was asked to determine which faction of a religious organization controlled church property. The first
of these decisions, Watson v. Jones, involved a disagreement between
two factions of a Kentucky church over whether to follow the antislavery, pro-federal government policy of the Presbyterian Church's
highest tribunal. 50 Both factions claimed ownership of the church
property, and one filed suit in federal court.5 1 In declining to resolve
the dispute, the Court noted that when church members form a hierarchical organization for religious purposes, civil courts must defer to
the highest entity on "questions of discipline, or of faith, or ecclesiastical rule, custom or law." 52 The Court provided three reasons for its
decision. First, individuals who unite to form hierarchical churches
voluntarily agree to abide by the decisions of church authorities, and
courts should subsequently give the church authorities' decisions
proper deference. 53 Second, civil courts are "incompetent judges" on
matters of church teaching. 54 Finally, deference protects the proper
boundaries between religion and the state. As the Court said:
[1] t is easy to see that if the civil courts are to inquire into all these
matters, the whole subject of the doctrinal theology, the usages and
48 See supra note 23.
49 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679 (1871).
50 Id. 715-17. This opinion has been called "the Marbuiy of institutional autonomy." Dane, supra note 32, at 1716.
51 Watson, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 714. Watson was decided before Erie Railroad Co.
v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), as a matter of federal common law because the Court
had not yet determined that the First Amendment applied to the states. Kedroff v.
Saint Nicholas Cathedral, 344 U.S. 94, 115-16 (1952).
52 Watson, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 727.
53 Id. at 729 ("It is of the essence of these religious unions, and of their right to
establish tribunals for the decision of questions arising among themselves, that those
decisions should be binding in all cases of ecclesiastical cognizance . . ").
54 Id. ("It is not to be supposed that the judges of the civil courts can be as com-

petent in the ecclesiastical law and religious faith of all these bodies as the ablest men
in each are in reference to their own. It would therefore be an appeal from the more
leamed tribunal in the law which should decide the case, to the one which is less
SO.").
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organization of every
customs, the written laws, and fundamental
must, be examined into with
religious denomination may, and
would deprive these bodies
minuteness and care .... This principle
.... 5
their own church laws
of the right of construing

the Watson princiEighty years later, the Court constitutionalized
5 7 "the Court used some of
Nicholas Cathedral,
58 Following
ples. 56 In Kedroff v. Saint
group rights.
religious
describe
to
language"
its broadest
conYork state legislature transferred
the Russian Revolution, the New
from Moscow-based religious
trol of a Russian Orthodox cathedral
59
Relying principally on Watson,
leaders to American church officials.
60
Watson, the Kedroff
the Court called the statute unconstitutional.
for religious organizations,
Court said, "radiates.., a spirit of freedom
or manipulation, in short,
an independence from secular control
free from state interference, '6 matters
1 Such
power to decide for themselves,
of faith and doctrine."
those
as
well
as
government
of church
protection under the Free
freedom, the Court said, has constitutional
evi62
this constitutional protection was
Exercise Clause. The extent of
PresbyteMemorial
Elizabeth Blue Hull
dent in PresbyterianChurch v. Mary
practice
6 3 where the Supreme Court struck down a state
rian Church,
factions on the basis of who had
of awarding property to religious
55 Id. at 733-34.
Blue Hull Mem'l Presbyterian Church,
56 Presbyterian Church v. Mary Elizabeth
344 U.S. at 116.
393 U.S. 440, 447 (1969); see Kedroff
57 344 U.S. 94 (1952).
58 Brady, supra note 32, at 1640.
59 Kedroff, 344 U.S. at 97-98.
60 Id. at 110.
393 U.S. at 446 (stating that the language
61 Id. at 116; see also PresbyterianChurch,
ring").
in Watson possessed "a clear constitutional
of
statement, the constitutional source
that
Despite
116.
at
62 Kedroff 344 U.S.
said
has
Court
unclear. After Kedroff the
the church autonomy doctrine is decidedly
without identifying either the Free
Amendment
that the doctrine is rooted in the First
E. Orthodox
Clause as the source. See Serbian
Exercise Clause or the Establishment
U.S. at 449.
393
Church,
Presbyterian
712 (1976);
Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696,
v.
Arlin M. Adams & William R. Hanlon,Jones
Scholars are split on the issue. Compare
REV.
L.
PA.
U.
128
Clauses of the First Amendment,
Wolf: ChurchAutonomy and the Religion
Free
arises out of the interaction of the
doctrine
the
that
1291, 1297 (1980) (arguing
1718-20
at
32,
note
supra
Dane,
and
Exercise and the Establishment Clauses),
Clause as a StructuralRestraint on CovernEstablishment
The
Esbeck,
H.
Carl
(same), with
(1998) (suggesting that the Establishment
mental Power, 84 IowA L. REv. 1, 10-11
"ecclesiasticivil government" matters including
Clause "sets apart from the sphere of
the teachand
prayers,
of
composing
the
cal governance, the resolution of doctrine,
is
doctrine
the
note 6, at 1396 (arguing that
ing of religion"), and Laycock, supra
rooted in Free Exercise concerns).
63 393 U.S. 440 (1969).
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most faithfully adhered to church teaching. 64 Such an approach
"requires the civil court to determine matters at the very core of a
religion-the interpretation of particular church doctrines and the
"65
importance of those doctrines to the religion.
In Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese v. Miivojevich,66 the Court later

extended the constitutional protection afforded to religious organizations to "disputes over church polity and church administration."6 7 A
defrocked bishop challenged both his removal and the power of the
Serbian Orthodox Church to reorganize his diocese. 68 The Illinois
Supreme Court called the bishop's removal invalid because the
church did not conduct its decisionmaking process in accordance
with the Church's constitution and penal code. 69 The Supreme Court
reversed, noting that the Illinois Supreme Court effectively substituted
its interpretation of church doctrine for the decision made by the
highest church authority. 70 From the Court's perspective, the church
decisions at issue concerned a "quintessentially religious" controversy
over church discipline 7 1 and an "issue at the core of ecclesiastical
72
affairs" involving the choice of clergy and diocesan reorganization.
Because the First Amendment permits religious groups to "establish
their own rules and regulations for internal discipline and government, and to create tribunals for adjudicating disputes over these matters, "the Court ruled that "the Constitution requires that civil courts
"73
accept their decisions as binding upon them. 1

Despite the broad language the Court used in Watson and its
progeny, those cases only involved narrow questions of intra-church
disputes. The subject matter of the disputes centered on control of
property,7 4 control over appointment of religious leaders, 7 5 and con64
65
66
67

Id. at 449-50.
Id. at 450.
426 U.S. 696 (1976).
Id. at 710.
68 Id. at 706-07.
69 Serbian E. Orthodox Church v. Milivojevich, 328 N.E.2d 268, 281 (Ill.
1975),
rev'd, 426 U.S. 696.
70 Milivojevich, 426 U.S. at 722.
71 Id. at 720.
72 Id. at 721.
73 Id. at 724-25.
74 See id. at 709; Presbyterian Church v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Mem'l Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. 440, 442 (1969); Kedroff v. Saint Nicholas Cathedral, 344 U.S.
94, 95 (1952); Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679, 681 (1871).
75 See Milivojevich, 426 U.S. at 715-18; Gonzalez v. Roman Catholic Archbishop,
280 U.S. 1, 10 (1929).
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76
To resolve those disputes, the
trol over church organization.
would have been required to
Supreme Court concluded that courts
in some capacity or interfere in the
either interpret religious doctrine
libAs Watson noted: "[R eligious
' 77 The line
internal governance of a church.
of the civil authority.
erty [is protected] from the invasion
continuing through Milivojevich
and
of cases beginning with Watson
conchurch autonomy are entitled to
makes clear that some areas of
stitutional protection.

B.

Law
Acceptance of Neutral Principles of

gradually backed away from its
However, the Supreme Court
protected scope of church autonbroad pronouncements about the
from an exclusively deferential
omy. The first movement away
that
Church, where the Court noted
approach began in Presbyterian
law, developed for use in all property
"there are neutral principles of
to
without 'establishing' churches
disputes, which can be applied
principle
this
' '7
The Court elaborated on
which property is awarded.
the Churches of God v. Church of God
in Maryland & VirginiaEldership of
of
79
a per curiam opinion the decision
at Sharpsburg,Inc., affirming in
upon
relying
by
property dispute
a Maryland court to resolve a church
of the dispute "involved no
statutory law because the resolution
80 The Maryland court relied on state
inquiry into religious doctrine.
to a local congregation, and the
law, the deeds conveying the property
to conclude that no eviconstitution of the religious organization
church intended to retain control
dence existed suggesting the parent8 1
As the Supreme Court later
over the local church property.
constitution were sufficiently
explained, the provisions of the church
analyze them without making an
express to enable a civil court could polity. 8 2
into church
"impermissible inquiry
that a state could adopt one of
Three Justices, however, noted
property disputes "so long as it
several approaches for settling church
' 3 Under the first
matters. "
involves no consideration of doctrinal
Kedroff 344 U.S. at 115.
76 See Milivojevich, 426 U.S. at 721;
this
Some commentators have relied upon
730.
at
Wall.)
(13
77 Watson, 80 U.S.
See
protection.
broad
receive
should
autonomy
language to conclude that church
text.
infra notes 181-85 and accompanying
449.
at
U.S.
78 Presbyterian Church, 393
79 396 U.S. 367 (1970) (per curiam).
80 Id. at 368.
of God v. Church of God at Sharpsburg,
81 Md. & Va. Eldership of the Churches
affd, 396 U.S. 367.
Inc., 254 A.2d 162, 166-71 (Md. 1969),
426 U.S. 696, 723 (1976).
Milivojevich,
v.
Diocese
Orthodox
82 Serbian E.
J., concurring).
(Brennan,
368-70
83 Md. & Va. Eldership, 396 U.S. at
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enforce decisions made by a
approach, seen in Watson, states could
church was congregational) or a
majority of church members (if the
hierarchical) ,84 provided the court
church tribunal (if the church was
religious language to deterrefrained from interpreting ambiguous
had the religious authority it
mine if a religious tribunal actually
85 Under a second approach, embraced in Presbyteclaimed to possess.
ownership by relying upon genrian Church, courts could determine
their
property disputes unless
8 6 Under
eral principles used to resolve
of religious doctrine.
application required an interpretation
Maryland Court of Appeals, courts
a third approach, taken by the
by state legislatures87carefully
could apply special statutes passed
of interference seen in Kedroff
crafted to avoid the degree
suggested that the deferenEight years later, a fourth Justice also
apply. 88 In an in-chambers
universally
not
did
Watson
of
approach
tial
9 rejected an argument that the First
opinion, then-Justice Rehnquist
and
from examining the structure
Amendment prevented courts
of determining whether personal
operation of a church for purposes
0
contacts. 9 In Justice Rehnminimum
on
based
existed
jurisdiction
never suggested that limits on the
quist's view, the Supreme Court
and determine matters of ecclesiastiability of a court to inquire into
applied "outside the context of such
cal organization and governance
9 1 Concerns about excessive entangleintraorganization disputes."
Rehnquist argued, "are not applicament in religious doctrine, Justice
third parties and a particular
ble to purely secular disputes between
fraud,
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92
defendant, albeit a religious affiliated
alleged."
are
violations
breach of contract, and statutory
deternotes 236-39 (explaining how courts
84 Id.; see also infra text accompanying
to which they should defer).
mine which faction of a church
at 368-70.
85 Md. & Va. Eldership, 396 U.S.
86 Id. at 370.
87 Id.
(1978) (Rehnv. Cal. Super. Ct., 439 U.S. 1369
88 Gen. Council on Fin. & Admin.
quist, Circuit J.).
in Milivojevich
Justice Stevens, had dissented
89 Justice Rehnquist, joined by
been instruhave
courts
Illinois
the
that
to indicate
because "[t]here is nothing . ..
other of a
the
or
intrusion by the State on one side
ments of any such impermissible
696, 733
U.S.
426
Diocese v. Milivojevich,
the
religious dispute." Serbian E. Orthodox
between
difference
no
saw
Justice Rehnquist
case
the
(1976) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
and
at issue in Maryland & Virginia Eldership
church constitutional provision
at hand. Id. at 734.
90 Gen. Council, 439 U.S. at 1372-73.
91 Id. at 1372.
92 Id.at 1373.
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Thus, in Jones v. Wolf,9 3 it was unsurprising when five Justices
rejected the argument that "the First Amendment requires the States
to adopt a rule of compulsory deference to religious authority in
resolving church property disputes, even where no issue of doctrinal
controversy is involved." 94 Writing for the Court, Justice Blackmun
expressly endorsed the idea that a state could choose any method of
settling a church property dispute provided the ultimate inquiry did
not involve any "'consideration of doctrinal matters, whether the ritual and liturgy of worship or the tenets of faith.'- 9 5 The neutral principles of law approach at issue in the case (courts evaluated deeds and
statutes to determine who owned property) passed constitutional scru96
tiny because it did not require courts to examine religious doctrine.
The Court also suggested that the neutral principles approach had
practical advantages over Watson-style deference: "The primary advantages of the neutral principles approach are that it is completely secular in operation, and yet flexible enough to accommodate all forms of
religious organization and polity.... It thereby promises to free civil
courts completely from entanglement in questions of religious doctrine, polity, and practice. '9 7 The neutral principles approach also
promoted "flexibility in ordering private rights and obligations to
reflect the intentions of the parties" because it allowed religious organizations to determine how disputes are settled via conventional common law means. 98
The majority recognized that the neutral principles approach was
not "wholly free of difficulty." 99 In particular, courts could not pay
attention to "religious precepts" when they examined neutral language.' 00 Furthermore, to the extent that religious documents incorporated religious concepts, "the court must defer to the resolution of
the doctrinal issue by the authoritative ecclesiastical body" when interpreting religious documents) OT The four Justices who dissented in
Jones presciently predicted that the majority's decision probably would
require more entanglement into religious doctrine than before 0 2 and
93 443 U.S. 595 (1979).
94 Id. at 605.
95 Id. at 602 (quoting Md. & Va. Eldership of the Churches of God v. Church of
God at Sharpsburg, Inc., 396 U.S. 367, 368 (1970) (Brennan, J., concurring)).
96 Id. at 603.
97 Id. Of course, courts are still required to consider whether such entanglement
will occur before they can apply the neutral principles approach.
98 Id.
99 Id. at 604.
100 Id.
101 Id.
102 Id. at 611-14 (Powell, J., dissenting).
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noted that the free exercise rights of the individuals associated with a
church would be harmed. 0 3 Instead, the Jones dissenters called for a
constitutional rule that would require churches to defer to the resolution of the dispute within the church itself.10 4 In rejecting the dissent's deference-only position, the Jones majority thus presented states
with a clearly defined choice between the neutral principles approach
approved in Jones or the more deferential approach espoused in
Watson. 05
C.

The Consequences of Using Neutral Principles

After Jones, courts rapidly adopted the "neutral principles" language to conclude, in a variety of contexts far from the property disputes that gave rise to the doctrine, that they could competently
analyze a variety of issues. For example, courts have applied the neutral principles approach to hold churches liable in actions for infliction of emotional distress, 10 6 defamation,10 7 breach of fiduciary
duty,1 0 8 sexual abuse,10 9 negligent hiring, retention, and supervi103 Id. at 616.
104 Id. at 618.
105 Following Jones, most states decided to adopt, in church property disputes, the
neutral principles approach the five-Justice majority deemed constitutional. See, e.g.,
St. Paul Church, Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of the Alaska Missionary Conference of the United
Methodist Church, Inc., 145 P.3d 541, 551-53 (Alaska 2006); Presbytery of Riverside
v. Cmty. Church of Palm Springs, 152 Cal. Rptr. 854, 859-60 (Ct. App. 1979); York v.
First Presbyterian Church of Anna, 474 N.E.2d 716, 719-21 (II. 1984); Presbytery of
Elijah Parish Lovejoy v. Jaeggi, 682 S.W.2d 465, 467-69 (Mo. 1984) (en banc); First
Presbyterian Church of Schenectady v. United Presbyterian Church, 464 N.E.2d 454,
459-60 (N.Y. 1984); Presbytery of Beaver-Butler v. Middlesex Presbyterian Church,
489 A.2d 1317, 1319-23 (Pa. 1985); Foss v. Dykstra, 342 N.W.2d 220, 222 (S.D. 1983).
Others, however, chose to stay faithful to the deferential approach the four-Justice
dissent preferred. See Fonken v. Cmty. Church of Kamrar, 339 N.W.2d 810, 816 (Iowa
1983); Tea v. Protestant Episcopal Church, 610 P.2d 182, 184 (Nev. 1980); Church of
God of Madison v. Noel, 318 S.E.2d 920, 923 (W. Va. 1984).
106 Calvary Christian Sch., Inc. v. Huffstuttler, No. 05-343, 2006 WL 1779525 (Ark.
June 29, 2006).
107 Id.; Berger v. Temple Beth-El of Great Neck, 756 N.Y.S.2d 94, 96 (App. Div.
2003).
108 Moses v. Diocese of Colo., 863 P.2d 310, 320 (Colo. 1993) (en banc); Fortin v.
Roman Catholic Bishop of Portland, 871 A.2d 1208, 1225-27 (Me. 2005). But see
Wende C. v. United Methodist Church, 776 N.Y.S.2d 390, 394 (App. Div. 2004) (finding that the claim "cannot be resolved in accordance with neutral principles of law,
i.e., without any judicial inquiry into religious precepts"), aff'd, 827 N.E.2d 265 (N.Y.
2005), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 346 (2005) (mem.).
109 Doe v. F.P., 667 N.W.2d 493, 498-500 (Minn. Ct. App. 2003).
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sion,1l° and breach of contract."' 1 The neutral principles approach
has not been limited to common law causes of action; courts have
concluded they are able to determine the propriety of garnishing
wages paid by a religious institution,' 1 2 the validity of applying unemployment laws to religious organizations, 13 and the applicability of
civil rights laws" 4 and tax laws.1 1 5 In some cases, courts expressly
drew on statutory provisions to provide applicable "neutral princi-

110 Rashedi v. Gen. Bd.of Church of the Nazarene, 54 P.3d 349, 353-55 (Ariz. Ct.
App. 2002); Malicki v. Doe, 814 So. 2d 347, 360-65 (Fla. 2002). But see Mulinix v.
Mulinix, No. C2-97-297, 1997 WL 585775, at *6 (Minn. Ct. App. Sept. 22, 1997) (holding that the plaintiffs claims "are fundamentally connected to issues of church governance"); Gibson v. Brewer, 952 S.W.2d 239, 247 (Mo. 1997) (en banc) ("J]udicial
inquiry into hiring, ordaining, and retaining clergy would result in an endorsement of
religion, by approving one model for church hiring, ordination and retention of
clergy."); S.H.C. v. Lu, 54 P.3d 174, 178-80 (Wash. Ct. App. 2002) (noting that
although the defendant's actions "may be secular in this case, that does not address
whether a civil court may avoid interpreting doctrine"); L.L.N. v. Clauder, 563 N.W.2d
434, 440-43 (Wis. 1997) (ruling that the court would have to interpret church law to
decide negligent supervision claim).
111 Minker v. Baltimore Annual Conference of United Methodist Church, 894
F.2d 1354, 1359-61 (D.C. Cir. 1990); Scholl v. Scholl, 621 A.2d 808, 810-12 (Del.
Fam. Ct. 1992) (divorce settlement requiring husband to cooperate with wife in
obtaining a Jewish divorce involved neutral principles); Jewish Ctr. of Sussex County
v. Whale, 397 A.2d 712, 714 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1978) ("[Alrrangements
between a pastor and his congregation are matters of contract subject to enforcement
in the civil court."), affd, 432 A.2d 521 (N.J. 1981); Kapsalis v. Greek Orthodox Archdiocese of N. & S. Am., 714 N.Y.S.2d 902, 902 (App. Div. 2000); Rende & Esposito
Consultants, Inc. v. St. Augustine's Roman Catholic Church, 516 N.Y.S.2d 959, 961-62
(App. Div. 1987) (seeking specific performance for breach of contract to sell property). However, breach of contract claims cannot concern the employment relationship if it involves a ministerial element. See Jae-Woo Cha v. Korean Presbyterian
Church, 55 Va. Cir. 480, 481-84 (Cir. Ct. 2000), afj'd, 553 S.E.2d 511 (Va. 2001); see
infra note 257 and accompanying text.
112 Rooney v. Rooney, 669 N.W.2d 362, 367-68 (Minn. Ct. App. 2003). But see
Malichi v. Archdiocese of Miami, No. ID05-5108, 2006 WL 3207982, at *5 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. Nov. 8, 2006) (declining to determine whether a priest is an employee for
purposes of receiving workman's compensation because of entanglement problems).
113 Newport Church of the Nazarene v. Hensley, 56 P.3d 386, 392 (Or. 2002).
114 Sacred Heart Sch. Bd. v. Labor & Indus. Review Comm'n, 460 N.W.2d 430,
432-33 (Wis. Ct. App. 1990) (holding that church autonomy protection applied only
to religious-based discrimination and not other discriminatory reasons).
115 Church of Scientology of Cal. v. Comm'r, 83 T.C. 381, 462 (1984) (holding
that the consultation of church materials and practices to determine whether a religious organization qualified for a tax exemption constituted a proper application of
neutral principles of law), affd 823 F.2d 1310 (9th Cir. 1987).
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virtually every court to conpies."1 16 In short, since Jones was decided,
outside of the context of church
sider the church autonomy defense
neutral principles approach,
property disputes has relied on Jones's
t7
to decide a case."
rather than Watson's deferential approach,
to properly apply the
Despite its popularity, courts have struggled
suggests that under the church
neutral principles approach. Jones
can be restricted to some
autonomy doctrine, church autonomy
clearly unconstitutional; the
extent. Some restrictions appear
clear that neutral principles can
Supreme Court has repeatedly made
have to determine a question of
only be applied if a court does not
1 18 But courts often toil to
religious doctrine, polity, and practice.
some even gloss over the issue
resolve that threshold inquiry, and
is even neutral in the first
about whether the applicable principle
the Supreme Court approved the
9
place.1 1 As previously mentioned,
it promised no unconstitutional
neutral principles approach because
pointed out that
12 0
Yet the Jones dissenters correctly
entanglement.
can apply the neutral principles
determining whether a court
necessarily entails an entangling
approach on a case-by-case basis
organization or doctrinal
inquiry into the religious group's

practices.1

21

a statute
(Minn. Ct. App. 2003) (holding that
116 Doe v. F.P., 667 N.W.2d 493, 500
aid, or
"advice,
provides
one
when
that occurs
creating liability for sexual misconduct
members).
comfort" could be applied to clergy
unusual
Court's decision in Newport Church was
Supreme
Oregon
the
117 Indeed,
that court
Instead,
apply.
to
sought
it
principle
in that it never defined the neutral
that the
doctrine did not survive Smith, and
concluded that the church autonomy
56
Church,
Newport
and general applicability.
unemployment law was one of neutral
suggested
court
the
test,
interest
a compelling
P.3d at 392-93. Alternatively, under
benefits outweighed any incidenunemployment
providing
in
interest
states'
that the
Id. at 393-94.
tal burden on a religious institution.
118 Dane, supra note 32, at 1737-44.
v. Hensley, 56 P.3d 386, 392-93 (devot119 See, e.g., Newport Church of Nazarene
But see
analysis of an unemployment law).
ing only one sentence to the neutrality
(N.Y.
463-64
459,
Albany v. Serio, 859 N.E.2d
Catholic Charities of the Diocese of
coverinsurance
mandating
that a law
2006) (spending nearly a full page discussing
were
though some religious activities
even
neutral
was
age for contraceptives
exempted from the law and not others).
604 (1979) ("[Tlhe promise of nonentangle120 SeeJones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595,
compenneutral principles approach more than
ment and neutrality inherent in the
note 6,
supra
in application."); cf. Laycock,
sates for what will be occasional problems
The
autonomy.
church
of
on the goal
at 1395 ("[T]he Court agreed unanimously
the
implement
better
would
approach
argument turned on whether the dissenters'
less secular interference.").
decision of the church itself with

121

dissenting).
See Jones, 443 U.S. at 612 (Powell, J.,
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Two competing principles thus exist. Neutral principles are permissible only if no impermissible entanglement with church affairs
occurs. Yet as Watson said 122 and numerous commentators illustrated,1 23 courts are ill-equipped to inquire into religious practices
and thus might be unable to determine when impermissible entanglement has occurred. 124 Cases involving allegations of sexual assault by
clergy members for negligent supervision best illustrate judicial
incompetence to satisfactorily resolve this inquiry on a case-by-case
basis. Faced with similar disputes that asked courts to determine
whether a Roman Catholic bishop acted reasonably when supervising
a priest alleged to have committed an assault, the Florida Supreme
Court concluded no impermissible interference would occur1 2 5 while
26
the Missouri Supreme Court held the exact opposite.1
The Supreme Court exacerbates the difficulty of conducting caseby-case inquiries by providing only a handful of examples of impermissible intervention, none of which establish a clear guidepost for determining when this excessive entanglement has occurred. The Court's
church autonomy line of cases since Kedroff all involve the interpretation of church documents. Yet the vast majority of courts facing a
church autonomy defense are not called upon to interpret church
documents. Instead, they are asked to determine the constitutionality
of interference with religious organization, operation, and activity, an
issue upon which the Supreme Court has remained silent. In the process of adjudicating church autonomy defenses on a case-by-case basis,
courts consistently demonstrate their incapability of inquiring into
religious practice and reaffirm the concerns the Watson Court originally expressed about having courts adjudicate religiously centered
disputes.
In light of the inherent difficulties of applying neutral principles
on a case-by-case basis, courts should adopt and rely upon a background principle that determines when they can adjudicate a religious dispute. Four possible outcomes emerge. At one extreme, some
scholars suggest courts should find that the First Amendment bars vir122 Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679, 729 (1871).
123 See Brady, supra note 32, at 1687.
124 Professor Brady identifies two potential problems when courts attempt to interpret religious doctrine. First, "[c] onflicts between religious doctrine and secular law
may exist, but they may not be visible at the outset to either the church or the courts."
Id. Second, "courts may be stymied by multiple interpretations of church doctrine."
Id.
125 Malicki v. Doe, 814 So. 2d 347, 360-61 (Fla. 2002); accord Roman Catholic
Diocese of Jackson v. Morrison, 905 So. 2d 1213, 1226 (Miss. 2005).

126 Gibson v. Brewer, 952 S.W.2d 239, 246-47 (Mo. 1997) (en banc).
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tually any intrusion into the inner operation of church affairs.' 2 7 At
the other extreme, courts could conclude that neutral principles of
law can always be applied, and thus the First Amendment is never violated by regulating any aspect of a church. 28 Neither approach is
satisfactory when viewed in light of the Supreme Court's precedents.
First, the Supreme Court established in Jones that some intrusion into
the inner affairs of a church is permissible.1 29 Second, the Court's
church autonomy precedents, cited approvingly in Smith, establish
that some areas of church autonomy remain off-limits to government
regulations.13 0 The other two outcomes involve adopting a rebuttable
presumption that either favors or opposes the application of neutral
principles. Here, the choice of Jones- Watson-style deference or neutral principles of law-lives on in another context. If a case-by-case
approach is unworkable, if absolute extremes are inconsistent with
Supreme Court precedent, and if the Court has shifted toward
encouraging more judicial involvement while consistently protecting
some areas of autonomy, which way should the presumption operate?
II.

THE INFLUENCE OF HISTORY AND SMITH ON CHURCH AUTONOMY

A presumption that courts can constitutionally apply neutral principles is preferable to either a case-by-case determination or a presumption against applying neutral principles of law. Two factors
guide the determination that courts should presume they are capable
of applying neutral principles of law: the historical attitudes toward
127 Brady, supra note 32, at 1698 ("[T]he only effective and workable protection
for the ability of religious groups to preserve, transmit, and develop their beliefs free
from government interference is a broad right of church autonomy that extends to all
aspects of church affairs."); Laycock, supra note 6, at 1417 ("Any interference with the
autonomy of these organizations jeopardizes free exercise rights of their members,
including the free development of religious doctrine.").
128 Hamilton, supra note 39, at 1216 ("'Church autonomy' is no doctrine at all but
rather a theory fundamentally at odds with the Constitution, its history, and the rule
of law it institutes."); cf. Underkuffler, supra note 32, at 1787 ("[G]ranting religious
groups sweeping freedom from civil laws carries with it far more costs than benefits.").
129 SeeJones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595, 602-04 (1979). Jones established that the application of neutral principles was permissible precisely because the dispute did not
require a court to examine religious doctrine. However, as "church autonomy" is
used in this Note, the Court in Jones essentially resolved the dispute itself instead of
declining jurisdiction and granting the religious factions the autonomy to adjudicate
the dispute themselves.
130 See Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 877 (1990); see also infra notes
196-206 and accompanying text (reconciling the church autonomy precedents with
Smith).
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religious groups when the Bill of Rights was ratified"I and the Court's
reshaping of free exercise jurisprudence in Smith. However, because
of historical evidence that also establishes the value of autonomous
religious institutions and because the Court has definitively protected
some areas of church autonomy, churches can rely on these
132
predefined spheres of influence to rebut this presumption.
A.

HistoricalInfluences on the Church Autonomy Doctrine

Two strands of historical thought help influence modern understanding of the church autonomy doctrine. On one hand, shortly
after the Constitution's ratification, most believed that religious organizations and the government each had exclusive sovereignty over
separate spheres of public life.1 33 On the other hand, others feared
131 The use of history to analyze the Religion Clauses is a relatively recent development. See generally Lee J. Strang, The (Re)turn to History in Religion Clause Law and
Scholarship, 81 NOTRE DAME L. Rrv. 1697 (2006) (summarizing the relatively recent
influence of historical materials on the Supreme Court's First Amendment cases). As
a result, there is a "seemingly irresistible impulse to appeal to history when analyzing
issues under the religion clauses," yet " It] his tendency is unfortunate because there is
no clear history as to the meaning of the clauses." JOHN E. NowAK & RONALD D.
ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAw § 17.2, at 1411 (7th ed. 2004).
As Professor Laycock noted, "Church-state relations were a much contested issue
at the time of the American Founding, and those debates left an unusually thick
record. All sides in modem debates have mined that record, however selectively, for
evidence of original understanding." Douglas Laycock, Regulatory Exemptions of Religious Behavior and the Original Understandingof the Establishment Clause, 81 NOTRE DAME
L. REv. 1793, 1793 (2006). The resulting approach often spirals into an exchange
where
One side cites Madison and Jefferson; the other side cites the defenders of
the established church .... At least in political and judicial debates, neither
side makes much effort to take account of the evidence offered by the other
side, or to craft a theory that explains why the Founders accepted government support of religion in some contexts and not in others....
The use of history has been selective not just in the sense that each side
prefers its own half of history, but also in the sense that some prominent
history is invoked repeatedly, and other history, less widely known, is largely
ignored.
Id. at 1793-94. To avoid falling into this trap, this Note's brief foray into differing
historical attitudes toward church autonomy seeks only to present competing perspectives for the purpose of providing a simple overview to promote a holistic understanding of the relevant historical materials.
132 See infra Part IHI.
133 Esbeck, supra note 9, at 1393 ("IT]he American solution to the church-state
problem was to deny to the civil government its prior authority over inherently religious questions, thus leaving such matters within the sole province of the church.").
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the harmful effects of religious groups when supported by government power.' 3 4 When pulled together, both strands support the idea
that certain spheres of religious life enjoyed some, but not complete,
immunity from government action.
Professor Carl Esbeck's exhaustive analysis of how organized
religion and government have coexisted reveals that Americans transplanted from Europe brought the idea that religious institutions and
governments enjoyed "dual authority" over public life.' 35 Yet Americans differed from their European counterparts because, after the
36
Founding, they gradually declined to prop up religious institutions.'
The "conventional wisdom" of the time held that "the existence of
healthy religious institutions was essential to the health of the state,
and that the existence of healthy religious institutions depended on
the support and protection of the state."'1 7 By contrast, "state estab13 8
lishment of religion had exactly the opposite effect."
Under a process Esbeck calls "disestablishment," states withdrew
from regulating religious affairs independently of the Establishment
Clause, because establishment efforts had the destabilizing effect of
"corrupting religion, the clergy, and the church."' 3 9 In Esbeck's view,
the dual-authority approach created "coexisting governmental and
religious institutions, the former with authority over the civil and the
latter having its province over the spiritual."1 40 Since the Supreme
Court constitutionalized some protections for religious institutions in
Kedroff' 4 ' Esbeck argues that "a free church and a limited state has
' 42
proven best for religion and best for civil government.'
Yet this separation was not absolute. At the time of the Founding,
the Framers conclusively believed in a broad right to complete freedom of belief' 4 3 but were more wary about the freedom to act.144 In
134
135
136
137
138
139
140
141
142
143

Hamilton, supra note 39, at 1154-56.
Esbeck, supra note 9, at 1589.
Id. at 1573.
Id. at 1573-74.
Id. at 1574.
Id. at 1590.
Id. at 1589.
Kedroffv. Saint Nicholas Cathedral, 344 U.S. 94, 115-21 (1952).
Esbeck, supra note 9, at 1592.
See, e.g., Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (July 31, 1788), in 13
THE PAPERS OF THOMASJEFFERSON 440, 442-43 (Julian P. Boyd et al. eds., 1956);James
Madison, Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments (1785), in 8
THE PAPERS OFJAMES MADISON 295, 299 (Robert A. Rutland et al. eds., 1973).
144 See Letter from Thomas Jefferson, supra note 143, at 442 ("The declaration
that religious faith shall be unpunished, does not give impunity to criminal acts dictated by religious error.").
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particular, the Establishment Clause is an example of the founding
generation's fear of a religious entity backed by the power of the government.1 4 5 Indeed, the underlying political philosophy of the time
(often associated with John Locke) regarded religious liberty as a
right to do "what was not lawfully prohibited." I 46 The importance of
church autonomy was of little concern to nineteenth-century government officials who sought to weaken the Roman Catholic Church by
targeting its internal affairs. 147 Instead of embracing a broad view of
protecting religious entities, the Framers were fearful of the effects of
religion. 148 Even James Madison, the drafter of the First Amendment,
worried at the end of his tenure that "'[t]he danger of silent accumulations & encroachments by Ecclesiastical Bodies have not sufficiently
engaged attention in the U.S.'

"149

For this latter group of Framers, the excesses of religious dominance in Europe, including the Inquisitions, the wars between Catholic and Protestant countries, and years of religious-based executions
counseled against extending broad protection to the activities of religious institutions.1 5 0 Yet as Esbeck forcefully shows, they coexisted with
other groups who firmly believed religious institutions-and therefore
society-benefited when government avoided entangling itself with
organized religions. Any sound articulation of the church autonomy
doctrine must therefore incorporate both attitudes.
B.

Lessons from Smith

The First Amendment principles announced in Smith also shed
light on the direction in which the background presumption should
operate. Smith has value in the church autonomy context, even
though the decision concerned the applicability of a statute to individual conduct, because of the sweeping implications of the opinion's
145 Hamilton, supra note 39, at 1145.
146 Ellis West, The Case Against a Right to Religion-Based Exemptions, 4 NOTRE DAME
J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 591, 624 (1990); see also City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S.
507, 539 (1997) (Scalia, J., concurring) ("[Tihe most plausible reading" of early laws
purporting to protect religion "is a virtual restatement of Smith: Religious exercise
shall be permitted so long as it does not violate general laws governing conduct.")
147 Richard W. Garnett, The Freedom of the Church, 4 J. CATHOLIC Soc. THOUGHT 59,
77 (2007); see also Philip Hamburger, Illiberal Liberalism: Liberal Theology, Anti-Catholicism, & Church Property, 12J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 693, 708-10 (2002).
148 Hamilton, supra note 39, at 1152.
149 LEONARD W. LEVY, THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE 98 (1986) (quoting James
Madison, Detached Memoranda, in Elizabeth Fleet, Madison's "DetachedMemoranda,"
3 Wm.& MARY Q. 534, 554 (1946)).
150 Hamilton, supra note 39, at 1154-56.
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religious claim."'
effectively creates a presumption
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because of the diversity of religthat favors invalidating a regulation
of
that would "open the prospect
ious beliefs-an unacceptable result
5

U.S. 872, 874 (1990).
151 Employment Div. v. Smith, 494
and Now,
Principle and Church Autonomy, Then
152 See Thomas C. Berg, The Voluntaiy
exercise
free
limited
that Smith "has significantly
2004 BYU L. REV. 1593, 1606 (noting
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right
to the existence of a constitutional
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Brady, supra
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275, 276-77 (1994); Hamilton, supra
Discriminate,21 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q.
at 1193-96.
648, 656-57
in the Diocese of Colo., 289 F.3d
153 See Bryce v. Episcopal Church
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(10th Cir. 2002) (concluding that
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1649.
154 Brady, supra note 32, at
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(1989)).
v. Comm'r, 490 U.S. 680, 699
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dogma.").
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constitutionally required religious exemptions from civic obligations
of almost every conceivable kind." 160
At first glance, Smith appears to provide little guidance in applying the church autonomy doctrine. The Court said nothing about the
extent to which generally applicable laws may place incidental burdens on the conduct of religious organizations. But the Court did
appear to preserve the church autonomy doctrine in some form by
noting that "it]he government may not... lend its power to one or
'1 6 1
the other side in controversies over religious authority or dogma.
Accordingly, some area of church autonomy remains immune to government regulation; the Court apparently left it to the lower courts to
figure outjust how much internal activity is off-limits and how to effectively apply neutral principles.
Yet upon closer examination, the Smith decision provides several
principles to help courts effectively apply the church autonomy doctrine to church action. First, six Justices in Smith echo Watson in noting the problems inherent in asking courts to determine the centrality
of a particular religious belief.16 2 In one view, the church autonomy
doctrine essentially protects from unconstitutional government interference matters that are "purely spiritual" 163 or fall within the "spiritual epicenter" of a church.1 6 4 Activities that lie outside this spiritual
epicenter can be regulated in proportion to their secularity.165 Such
160
161

Id. at 888-89 (listing examples of exemptions).
Id. at 877 (citing Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696,

708-25 (1976); Presbyterian Church v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Mem'l Presbyterian

Church, 393 U.S. 440, 445-52 (1969); Kedroffv. Saint Nicholas Cathedral, 344 U.S.
94, 95-119 (1952)).
162 See Smith, 494 U.S. at 886-87; id. at 906-07 (O'Connorj, concurring) ("[Olur
determination of the constitutionality of Oregon's general criminal prohibition cannot, and should not, turn on the centrality of the particular religious practice at
issue.").
163 A South Carolina court of equity was the first American court to use this phrase
in a published opinion. See Harmon v. Dreher, 17 S.C. Eq. (Speers Eq.) 87, 131-32
(1843) (holding that the "power of the church is purely spiritual" and cannot impose
civil sanctions). Later courts have struck down laws that purport to define religious
activity as that which is "purely spiritual." See Espinosa v. Rusk, 634 F.2d 477, 480
(10th Cir. 1980), affd, 456 U.S. 951 (1982); cf Montrose Christian Sch. Corp. v.
Walsh, 770 A.2d 111, 122 (Md. 2001) (declaring a statute containing the phrase
"purely religious functions" unconstitutional).
164 Bruce N. Bagni, Discrimination in the Name of the Lord: A Critical Evaluation of
Discriminationby Religious Organizations,79 COLUM. L. Rwv. 1514, 1539 (1979). Among
the categories that Bagni considers within the spiritual epicenter are the relationship
between a church and a minister, membership policies, religious education, worship,
and ritual. Id.
165 See id. at 1540.
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an inquiry, however, effectively requires courts to "determine the
place of a particular belief in a religion" t6 6-- something both Presbyterian and Jones say is impermissible. 1 67 If a court is to apply the church
autonomy doctrine, it cannot consider "how secular" an activity is, for
that establishes the very balancing test the doctrine purports to reject.
The fact that religion is implicated in any context is sufficient to raise
First Amendment concerns. 168 But by adopting a presumption which
assumes government action will not intrude on "purely spiritual"
areas, courts create problematic and unworkable secular-religious distinctions. The Smith Court concluded it needed to draw a clearly
defined rule to avoid troublesome case-by-case inquiries. 169
The question for the Smith Court, and the question courts facing
a church autonomy defenses must address, is how courts should construct such a rule. Is every regulation that burdens institutional autonomy presumptively invalid, or do the problems associated with carving
out piecemeal exceptions necessitate imposing some generally applicable standard in spite of those burdens? In a sense, this question is
analogous to the choice presented by Jones-are courts required to
defer to the decisions of church administrators, or can they overrule
those decisions if neutral principles of law can be applied? 170 The
Smith Court ultimately concluded that when faced with the danger of
proliferating religious-based exemptions, courts should leave decisions about the creation of such exemptions to the political process. 17 1 As the Court said: " [T ] o say that a nondiscriminatory religious
practice exemption is permitted, or even that it is desirable, is not to
say that it is constitutionally required, and that the appropriate occa72
sions for its creation can be discerned by the courts."'
The same principle applies to religious group autonomy. The
Supreme Court concluded that incidental burdens on church autonomy, just like incidental burdens on individual religious conduct,
166 Smith, 494 U.S. at 887 (majority opinion).
167 SeeJones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595, 602 (1979); Presbyterian Church v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Mem'l Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. 440, 449-52 (1969).
168 Nussbaum, supra note 43.
169 See Smith, 494 U.S. at 882-89.
170 Cf Berg, supra note 152, at 1611-12 (describing one way of viewing Jones that
finds its approval of neutral principles to be a precedent "for the Smith ruling that a
neutral, generally applicable law satisfies the Free Exercise Clause no matter how serious a restriction it imposes on religious practice").
171 See Smith, 494 U.S. at 890 ("[A] society that believes in the negative protection
accorded to religious belief can be expected to be solicitous of that value in its legislation as well.").
172 Id. (emphasis added).
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could be justified in certain instances. 1 73 When faced with a decision
to proceed with a case-by-case approach or adopt a broad principle,
the Smith Court chose to adopt a broad principle that favored concluding that incidental burdens on individual conduct caused by neutral, generally applicable laws are constitutional.1 74 Although the
Supreme Court has not explicitly taken a similar step in the church
autonomy doctrine, Smith implies that a presumption that favors
greater application of neutral principles of law would align the doctrine to existing First Amendment jurisprudence and result in pragmatic benefits.
Admittedly, "neutral principles of law" are not the same as "neutral laws of general applicability." However, the Supreme Court has
defined a neutral law as one that does not "target[ ] religious beliefs
as such" or have as its "object ... to infringe upon or restrict practices
because of their religious motivation." 175 Although there is no analo-

gous definition for "neutral principles of law," in the church autonomy context, some courts have used the terms "neutral principles of
law" and "neutral laws" interchangeably. 176 However, the original
concept of "neutral principles of law" developed in the context of
property disputes, where principles for interpreting written documents had been well established. As later courts properly noted, neutral principles of law can also be well-established principles espoused
in contract 1 7 7 and tort 78 actions or supplied by statute. 179 Nothing in
the Supreme Court's case law indicates that, for the purposes of the
church autonomy doctrine, neutral and generally applicable laws can173 See id. at 878. In the church autonomy context, incidental burdens can be
imposed unless the process of imposing those burdens interferes with matters of faith,
doctrine, church governance, and polity. See infra Part III. The class of incidental
burdens that could be imposed on individual religious conduct was much smaller;
such burdens were constitutional only if they were justified by a compelling government interest. See Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 402-03 (1963).
174 See Smith, 494 U.S. at 888 ("[Wle cannot afford the luxury of deeming presumptively invalid, as applied to the religious objector, every regulation of conduct that
does not protect an interest of the highest order.").
175 Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 533
(1993).
176 See, e.g., Moses v. Diocese of Colo., 863 P.2d 310, 320 (Colo. 1993) ("The 'neutral principles' doctrine ... allows a court to apply the neutral laws of the state to
religious organizations but forbids a court from resolving disputed issues of religious
doctrine and practice.").
177 See, e.g., Rende & Esposito Consultants, Inc. v. St. Augustine's Roman Catholic
Church, 516 N.Y.S.2d 959, 961-62 (App. Div. 1987).
178 See, e.g., Malicki v. Doe, 814 So. 2d 347, 364 (Fla. 2002).
179 See, e.g., Md. & Va. Eldership of the Churches of God v. Church of God at
Sharpsburg, Inc., 396 U.S. 367, 367-68 (1970) (per curiam).
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ity." 1 As applied by some courts,
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2 Two problems exist with this approach.
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18 3 Thus, the right of
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with church doctrine. Second,
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1 8 4 This kind of presumption operates
mine when it can be sued.
are free
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limits are imposed
to believe what they want, but
1 85
act.
Nicholas Cathedral,
J., concurring); Kedroff v. Saint
180 See id. at 370 (Brennan,
344 U.S. 94, 98 n.2, 99 n.3 (1952).
(13 Wall.) 679, 730 (1871).
181 Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S.
(en banc).
952 S.W.2d 239, 247 (Mo. 1997)
182 See, e.g., Gibson v. Brewer,
at 1687.
183 See Brady, supra note 32,
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185 See Cantwell v. Connecticut,
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For some, those problems actually counsel in favor of granting
broad constitutional protection for church autonomy. Under this
view, most recently espoused by Professor Kathleen Brady, the principles in Smith, although they facially eliminate religious exemptions,
actually stand for a broader protection of religion.1 6 Concededly,
while Smith does support the constitutionality of a presumption favoring the application of neutral principles, it also approvingly cites
existing church autonomy precedents and therefore suggests neutral
principles of law cannot override some aspects of church autonomy.
As Brady suggests, Smith said nothing about infringing the freedom to
believe, only the freedom to act, and religious organizations play a
fundamental role in cultivating religious doctrine.'8 7 Because "[flull
freedom of belief is not possible without a corresponding right of
religious groups to teach, develop, and practice their doctrines and
ideas .

..

s]pecial protections for religious organizations are neces-

sary at least where government regulation interferes with religious
belief or practice," ' and this framework incorporates sufficient
protections.
But it goes too far to say, as Professor Brady does, that because
courts cannot adequately define the relationship between religious
practices and nonreligious practices, churches should enjoy a "broad
right of church autonomy that extends to all aspects of church
affairs." 1 99 Brady argues that individual religious beliefs enjoy considerable protection, that those beliefs are often fostered by a religious
organization, and that an organization often creates and expresses its
beliefs via a variety of religious practices.1 90 Yet Professor Brady's
forceful claim dances around the dangerous potential of religiously
motivated conduct, the chief concern the Smith Court sought to
address. "Religion, when 'combined' in groups and institutions,
wields tremendous social, economic, and political power."1 9 1 In some
cases, this power can be used for harmful purposes;' 92 in others, it can
be used for beneficial purposes.1 9 3 To the extent that broad protecFirst Amendment jurisprudence, we have recognized that the freedom to act, unlike
the freedom to believe, cannot be absolute.").
186 See Brady, supra note 32, at 1636 ("When read carefully, Smith supports a broad
right of church autonomy that extends to all aspects of church affairs ...
187 See id. at 1676.
188 Id. at 1677.
189 Id. at 1698.
190 See id. at 1675-77.
191 Underkuffler, supra note 32, at 1786.
192 See supra notes 143-50 and accompanying text.
193 In Professor Brady's view, religious groups are "buffers against overweening
state power," "enhance individual autonomy," "provide a realm of privacy, intimacy,

....
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that religious institution for religious autonomy benefits society or
suggest, 194 Smith definitively
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assume responsibility for safeestablished that legislatures should
In this context, organizations
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than individuals. "With the
should enjoy no more special protection
currently engulfs vast parts of the
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should1 9be
5
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inadequate."
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The Supreme Court's decision in
and focus on the neutrality of
ignore the burden on religious activity
church autonomy context,
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focus on the neutrality of the law.
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line of cases, such that no areas
Smith completely eradicate the Watson
constitutional protection? If not,
of church autonomy now deserve
manageable lines so they can conhow should courts draw judicially
church autonomy with which the
sistently determine the spheres of
interfere?
government may not constitutionally
III.

THREE SPHERES OF CHuRcH AUTONOMY

Smith concerns whether the
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and if so, how the church
Court left any room for religious autonomy,
Smith's attack on religious-based
19 6
autonomy doctrine squares with
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at the neutrality
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and supportive social bonds," "address[
temporal
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of
shape
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about
say
to
"have much
06
ral concerns of government," and
(collecting
see also id. at 1703-04 nn.403order." Brady, supra note 32, at 1703-04;
views).
articles that also express these

46 B.C. L. REv. 461, 565 (2005)
Cf Paul Horwitz, Grutter's First Amendment,from a substantive concern with the
has traveled
("[T]he Court's treatment of religion
generpractices to a less protective, but more
and
groups
religious
distinctive role of
formal neutrality.").
ally applicable, fact-intensive focus on
1786.
195 Underkuffler, supra note 32, at
194

196

U.S. 872, 886 (1990).
See Employment Div. v. Smith, 494
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19 7 But Smith also explicitly left room for
19 8
burden on religious conduct.
of church autonomy.
specific, albeit narrowly defined, areas
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20 2
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claim to protect.
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The church autonomy doctrine thus
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HypoGiselle Davison, Note, The "Extreme and
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enacting
in
neutral
remains
state
the
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Furthermore, as Esbeck

shows, 20 3 creating spheres of autonomy over which religious institu-

tions enjoy exclusive dominion is consistent with historical attitudes
toward religious institutions shortly after the ratification of the Bill of
20 4
Rights.
It seems hypocritical to criticize the current application of the
church autonomy doctrine for its arbitrary and inconsistent application by proposing a general principle, and then carve out exceptions
to that principle that some might argue would lead to equally inconsistent application. However, this approach best reconciles Smith with
the existing church autonomy precedents. When viewed in light of
Smith, the church autonomy precedents stand for the idea that courts
can craft at least three exemptions from the general rule that they can
constitutionally adjudicate a dispute involving neutral principles of
05
law.2
203 See Esbeck, supra note 9, at 1589 ("For seventeen centuries now these two centers of authority have at times competed and at times cooperated. While the exact
boundaries between the two remain conflicted, it is understood that although the
respective jurisdictions overlap at many points, nevertheless there are subject matters
over which the state has sovereign power and subject matters over which the church
has exclusive authority.").
204 Brady argues that any attempt to define "a set of activities that are inherently or
quintessentially religious" is futile. Brady, supra note 32, at 1690. She argues that
when government officials, including judges, address religious questions in areas different from their own faith traditions, two problems erupt. First, "aspects of church
life which are uniquely or quintessentially religious are not obvious." Id. Second,
"the aspects of church administration that are quintessentially religious differ from
group to group." Id. at 1692.
Brady's solution to this problem is to extend broad constitutional protection to
any internal activity of a church. But her approach runs opposite to the Supreme
Court's view espoused in Smith. Rather than extend broad constitutional protection
to individual free exercise claims, the Court left decisions to grant religious exemptions in the hands of legislatures. This Note follows the Court's position by narrowly
defining the scope of constitutional protection, allowing judges to decide when religious group activity falls into areas of protection already identified by the Supreme
Court instead of creating new constitutional boundaries, and encouraging legislative
bodies to provide additional protection for areas of institutional autonomy that the
church autonomy doctrine does not protect with a constitutional rule. See infra notes
280-98 and accompanying text.
205 The three exemptions from this generally applicable rule are a church's freedom to define and interpret its own religious doctrine, see infra Part III.A, a church's
freedom to determine its own organizational structure, see infra Part IllB, and a
church's freedom to govern the relationship with its ministers, see infra Part III.C. Cf
Dane, supra note 32, at 1730-36 (suggesting that the church autonomy doctrine is
consistent with Smith insofar as it avoids created case-by-case exemptions from generally applicable laws).
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The Supreme Court has explicitly defined two spheres of church
autonomy, one that involves a church's freedom to determine and
interpret its religious doctrine and another that protects a church's
power to organize its internal structure. Lower courts, drawing on
inferences from Supreme Court precedent, uniformly embrace a
third sphere, albeit in different degrees, governing the relationship
between a minister and a church. If a court presumes that it can constitutionally apply the neutral principles approach, a religious group
could rebut that presumption by showing that the government action
involves intrusion into one of these three spheres of protected
activity.

20 6

A.

Power over Doctrine

The first sphere of religious group autonomy prohibits courts
from defining or interpreting religious doctrine and adjudicating
religious controversies between different factions of a church. Such
an approach is proper, the Supreme Court has said, because "[i]t is
not to be supposed that the judges of the civil courts can be as competent in the ecclesiastical law and religious faith of all these bodies as
20
the ablest men in each are in reference to their own."

7

The Court emphasized this principle in Milivojevich when it
rebuked the Illinois Supreme Court for its chosen approach for resolving a church controversy. The Illinois Supreme Court purported to
apply "neutral principles" to determine whether the Serbian Orthodox Church had the power under its constitution to divide the American-Canadian Diocese into three Dioceses. 208 The state court made its
determination by concluding that the early history of the AmericanCanadian Diocese "manifested a clear intention to retain indepen206 These spheres ultimately overlap to some extent. For example, a decision to
hire and fire a minister involves the church's authority over its internal structure. See
Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696, 717 (1976). Such a decision also involves its power to define its own doctrine through the minister. See
McClure v. Salvation Army, 460 F.2d 553, 559 (5th Cir. 1972) ("The minister is the
chief instrument by which the church seeks to fulfill its purpose."). But cf. infra note
237 (discussing how courts can nevertheless consult written church documents if the
process does not require interpreting religious doctrine).
Others might say that these are not spheres of constitutionally protected autonomy. Instead, they might point out that the Supreme Court has said any infringement
with church autonomy is unconstitutional. The chief difference between these positions is that this Note defines the phrase "church autonomy" broadly, while other
commentators have defined the phrase "church autonomy" narrowly to include what
this Note calls constitutionally protected autonomy.
207 Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679, 729 (1871).
208 See Milivojevich, 426 U.S. at 707-08.
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"ecclesiastically and judicially
dence and autonomy" while becoming
9
Church." 20 The court interan organic part of the Serbian Orthodox
American-Canadian and Serbian
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support its historical determinaOrthodox Church constitutions to
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2 15
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materials.
its own religious
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of a
ship.2

14

rejected the power
The Supreme Court has emphatically
by which a church can wor-

legislative body to define the procedures present evidence of such
that
ship,2 1 5 and the handful of opinions
this
enjoy considerable success defending
cases indicate that churches
entity
government
2 16 Accordingly, when a
sphere of autonomy.
may worship, the church's internal
attempts to define how a church
autonomy doctrine.
affairs are protected by the church
church's power to act a certain
Second, a party may challenge a
If the documents are not "so
way by referring to religious documents.
a
enforce them without engaging in
express that the civil courts could
1975),
Milivojevich, 328 N.E.2d 268, 283 (Il.
209 Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese v.
rev'd, 426 U.S. 696.
210 See id. at 282-84.
211 Milivojevich, 426 U.S. at 721.
there was no
Rehnquist believed, however, that
212 See id. at 722-24. Then-Justice
in Maryland
issue
at
and the religious provisions
difference between the case at hand
89.
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see
J., dissenting);
& Virginia Eldership. Id. at 734 (Rehnquist,
721.
213 See Milivojevich, 426 U.S. at
66 F.3d 1337,
of Kosher Meat & Food Control,
Bureau
v.
214 See, e.g., Barghout
A.2d 1353,
608
County Kosher, Inc. v. State,
1341-46 (4th Cir. 1995); Ran-Day's
unconstitutionally
kosher
products sold as
1363-65 (N.J. 1992) (state law regulating
kosher).
constituted
what
regarding
defined Jewish doctrine
94, 107-08 (1952).
U.S.
Cathedral, 344
215 See Kedroff v. Saint Nicholas
state law because it viodown
(striking
at 1340-46
because
216 Cf, e.g., Barghout, 66 F.3d
Such a result is generally unsurprising,
lated the Establishment Clause).
activity.
targeted at religious
these laws are almost always specifically
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searching and therefore impermissible inquiry into church polity,"
then the court must decline to hear the dispute. 2 17 Otherwise, a court
violates Milivojevich by interpreting the religious documents at issue.
Thus, when a court attempts to interpret a religious precept, and the
court's interpretation of that religious tenet differs from the interpretation proffered by the church, the church autonomy doctrine protects the religious organization's interpretation.
Courts have frequently found that they lack jurisdiction when the
dispute involves different factions of a religious organization.2 1 8 By
contrast, when a dispute involves a religious organization and a nonaffiliated party, courts regularly declare they do not have to resolve a
religious controversy to adjudicate the dispute.2 19 Here, an important
distinction must be drawn between religious doctrine and religious
motives. Religious doctrine is often implicated when a party asks a
court to determine what a religious provision means. Unless that
religious provision is express, courts may not interpret the provision
and must refrain from exercising jurisdiction. 22 0 However, religious
motives describe religious-based reasons for acting a certain way; in
this case, courts can usually constitutionally adjudicate the dispute.
Consider a hypothetical situation involving a church opposed to
abortion that decides to lease land for an abortion clinic. A faction of
the church's supporters file suit seeking an injunction because the
church's religious law prevents it from leasing its land to abortion supporters. Unless the faction's argument relies upon a provision sufficiently clear to enable the court to resolve the dispute without
interpreting the provision (and by extension, religious doctrine), the
court should decline to exercise jurisdiction over the dispute and
instead defer to the position advocated by the highest church
2 21
authority.
Now suppose that the church decides to break its agreement to
lease the land and the abortion clinic files suit alleging a breach of
contract. As a defense, the church argues that performance is impractical because its religious laws forbid leasing land to abortion providers. While the church has a religious motive for breaching its
217 Milivojevich, 426 U.S. at 723. Of course, what constitutes "express" is hard to
determine. See id. at 734 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
218 See, e.g.,
id. at 715-16 (majority opinion); Kedroff 344 U.S. at 114-17; Watson v.
Jones, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679, 733-34 (1871).
219 Cf supra notes 177-78 and accompanying text (explaining how courts readily
adjudicate contract and tort disputes involving churches and nonaffiliated parties).
220 Milivojevich, 426 U.S. at 723.
221 See infra notes 236-39 and accompanying text (explaining the methods by
which courts determine what faction is the church's highest authority).
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contract, courts can still apply neutral principles of law to adjudicate
the dispute. Under the presumption adopted in Part 11, a court
should conclude it can decide the merits of the case because it will not
unconstitutionally interfere in church autonomy. Because religious
motives-and not religious doctrine-are at issue, a court should treat
the religious-based justification for failing to honor the contract the
2 22
same as an economic-based reason.
B.

Power over Structure

Church structure disputes involve the power of a church to determine its own organizational structure as well as determine who within
the church has ultimate decisionmaking power to resolve certain
religious controversies. Support for a church's freedom to determine
its own structure comes directly from Kedroff and Milivojevich. The
Court in Kedroff struck down a state statute declaring what faction had
control over a Russian church's property.2 2 3 Religious freedom, the
Court said, includes the "power to decide for themselves, free from
state interference, matters of church government ..... 224 Nor can
judges broadly declare which faction of a church has power to make
decisions; the role of courts in such disputes is carefully prescribed by
the Supreme Court.2 25 Likewise, in Milivojevich, the Court declined to
exercise jurisdiction over a challenge to a restructuring of the Serbian
Orthodox Church, holding that "the reorganization of the Diocese
222 Cf Rende & Esposito Consultants, Inc. v. St. Augustine's Roman Catholic
Church, 516 N.Y.S.2d 959, 961-62 (App. Div. 1987) (holding that disputes involving a
title to real property in a case where a church's board of trustees failed to approve the
a contract previously signed with a developer could be settled by applying neutral

principles of law).
223 Kedroff 344 U.S. at 110.
224 Id. at 116.
225 See Kreshik v. Saint Nicholas Cathedral, 363 U.S. 190, 190-91 (1960) (per
curiam); infra notes 236-39 and accompanying text. After the Court handed down its
decision in Kedroff the New York Court of Appeals remanded the case to consider a
common law issue not addressed by the Court's Kedroff opinion, which was decided
on statutory grounds. Kreshik, 363 U.S. at 191. Following trial, the Court of Appeals
entered judgment in favor of the petitioners and awarded them control over the
church property. See id. The Supreme Court reversed, noting that "the decision now

under review rests on the same premises which were found to have underlain the
enactment of the statute struck down in Kedroff and that "it is established doctrine
that '[i]t is not of moment that the State has here acted solely through its judicial
branch, for whether legislative or judicial, it is still the application of state power
which we are asked to scrutinize.'" Id. (quoting NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 463

(1958)).
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involves a matter of internal church government, an issue at the core
226
of ecclesiastical affairs."
This sphere of autonomy produces the greatest confusion. Does
control over church "government" and "authority" include control
over all aspects of the internal affairs of a church? Or does it include
exclusive control only over some limited aspects, with the government
possessing the power to regulate the rest? While the Supreme Court
has not expressly ruled on the extent of this protection, lower courts
generally conclude that the internal decisionmaking power of a
church can be infringed upon by statute only if the intrusion does not
affect the structure of the church.
22 7
For example, in Catholic Charitiesof the Diocese of Albany v. Serio,
several religious organizations protested the application of a neutral,
generally applicable law that required them to provide insurance coverage for contraceptives.2 28 The organizations objected to financing
what they believed was sinful activity. 229 On one hand, the application
of the law clearly had an effect on organizational governance-it
effectively forced the religious organizations to compensate their
employees in a specified manner. 230 On the other hand, as the New
York Court of Appeals ultimately concluded, the law "merely regulates
one aspect of the relationship between plaintiffs and their
23 1
employees."
The Supreme Court's previous jurisprudence is instrumental in
understanding that the Catholic Charities court properly applied the
church autonomy doctrine. The language in Supreme Court cases
233
concerns "religious controversies" 3 2 and issues of "authority."
Unlike Watson, Kedroff and Milivojevich, where the dispute concerned
who had decisionmaking power within a religious organization, Catholic Charities involved a question of whether the church had religious
autonomy. The distinction is extremely significant. A dispute of the
kind seen in Watson is a quintessential structural dispute between factions of a religious organization over the power to make decisions on
226 Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696, 721 (1976).
227 859 N.E.2d 459 (N.Y. 2006).
228 Id. at 461.
229 Id. at 463.
230 See id. at 461.
231 Id. at 465.
232 Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595, 608 (1979); Gen. Council on Fin. & Admin. v. Cal.
Super. Ct., 439 U.S. 1369, 1373 (1978) (Rehnquist, CircuitJ,); Serbian E. Orthodox
Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696, 710 (1976).
233 Jones, 443 U.S. at 605; Milivojevich, 426 U.S. at 715; Kedroff v. Saint Nicholas
Cathedral, 344 U.S. 94, 106 (1952).
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the church has no power to
behalf of that organization. By contrast,
by the application of
say its authority over internal affairs is burdened
exemp2 34
Such power effectively creates religious-based
a neutral law.
anomare
when those exemptions
tions in the organizational context
of
The application of a neutral law
alous in the individual context.
authority
never interfere with church
235
general applicability will almost
doctrine.
autonomy
church
under this sphere of the
that the application of a neutral
If, however, a court concludes
alter the structure of a religious
principle of law would effectively
purlimited jurisdiction for the sole
organization, it can only exercise
asks
Watson
a court should defer.
pose of determining to what faction
hierarchical and congregational
courts to distinguish between
because par23 6 Such deference is appropriate, Watson says,
churches.
organizareligious
associate and form a
ties that exercise the right to
over
organization has sole jurisdiction
tion implicitly agree that the
2 37
Accordingly, in a congregational church,
religious-based disputes.
congregamade in accordance with the
courts defer to the decisions
238 in a hierarchical church,
tion's internal decisionmaking process;
church's highest religious
to the decisions made by the
courts defer
239
authority.
C.

Power over the MinisterialRelationship

of church autonomy each involve
The aforementioned spheres
The
of a religious organization.
disputes between different factions
that
of those two spheres and suggests
third sphere draws on aspects
to this claim is that courts consist234 See supraPart II. A natural counterargument
See infra notes
neutral law, to ministerial employees.
not
ently refuse to apply Title VII, a
protection
VII
Title
enjoy
However, churches
but
245-46 and accompanying text.
authority,
of autonomy protecting church
relabecause it interferes with the sphere
church-minister
of autonomy protecting the
because it interferes with the sphere
III.C.
tionship. See infra Part
B.R. 842, 852
Archbishop of Portland in Or., 335
235 See, e.g., In re Roman Catholic
bankruptcy
the
of
part
is
of whether property
(Bankr. D. Or. 2005) ("[T]he question
faith, docof
matters
[resolving]
does not require
estate under the Bankruptcy Code
trine, or governance.").
(13 Wall.) 679, 722-29 (1871).
236 See Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S.
autonomy allows a
the dogmatic sphere of church
237 See id. at 729. Of course,
religious organto determine to which faction of a
court to consult written documents
that it avoids
so
provisions are sufficiently express
ization it should defer only if the
interpreting religious doctrine.
238 See id. at 724-25.
239 See id. at 726-27.
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religious organizations enjoy a varied amount of freedom over the
2 40
church-minister relationship.
This sphere of autonomy draws its strength from Gonzalez v.
Roman Catholic Archbishop.24 1 The petitioner claimed a right to a religious appointment, but the Catholic Church refused to appoint him
because he did not meet the established qualifications.2 42 Ruling for
the church, the Supreme Court said that "[b] ecause the appointment
is a canonical act, it is the function of the church authorities to determine what the essential qualifications of a chaplain are and whether
the candidate possesses them." 243 Furthermore, the Court noted that
"[i)n the absence of fraud, collusion, or arbitrariness, the decisions of
the proper church tribunals on matters purely ecclesiastical, although
affecting civil rights, are accepted in litigation before the secular
courts as conclusive."

244

Courts have adopted a categorical rule that allows churches to
hire and fire ministers. The "ministerial exception" is the most com245
mon application of this sphere of the church autonomy doctrine.
Courts of appeals have unanimously found that the ministerial exception protects churches from liability in Title VII employment disputes. 246 The principal controversy concerning the ministerial
exception governs its scope-who exactly can courts consider a "min-

240 See Brady, supra note 32, at 1651-56 & nn.l10-44 (describing the application
of the ministerial exception and collecting cases).
241 280 U.S. 1 (1929). Like Watson, Gonzalez was decided as a matter of federal
common law. Laycock, supra note 6, at 1389 n.129.
242 See Gonzalez, 280 U.S. at 12-13.
243 Id. at 16. As the Court later said, "[ffreedom to select the clergy, where no
improper methods of choice are proven ...must now be said to have federal constitutional protection as part of the free exercise of religion against state interference."
Kedroff v. Saint Nicholas Cathedral, 344 U.S. 94, 116 (1952).
244 Gonzalez, 280 U.S. at 16.
245 The Fifth Circuit was the first court to explicitly recognize this exception in
McClure v. Salvation Army, 460 F.2d 553, 558-61 (5th Cir. 1972). Other circuits have
followed suit. See infra note 246.
246 See Petruska v. Gannon Univ., 462 F.3d 294, 305 (3d Cir. 2006); Alicea-Hernandez v. Catholic Bishop, 320 F.3d 698, 702-04 (7th Cir. 2003); Gellington v. Christian Methodist Episcopal Church, Inc., 203 F.3d 1299, 1303-04 (11th Cir. 2000);
Bollard v. Cal. Province of the Soc'y of Jesus, 196 F.3d 940, 945-50 (9th Cir. 1999);
Scharon v. St. Luke's Episcopal Presbyterian Hosps., 929 F.2d 360, 363 (8th Cir.
1991); Rayburn v. Gen. Conference of Seventh-Day Adventists, 772 F.2d 1164,
1168-69 (4th Cir. 1985). The Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit explicitly concluded the ministerial exception survived Smith. See EEOC v. Catholic Univ. of Am.,
83 F.3d 455, 463-67 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
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2 47 Courts have expanded the
ister" for the purposes of the exception?
officials beyond ordained
ministerial exception to include church
considered a communications
clergy.2 48 For example, courts have 2 50
and a teacher at a religious
officer,2 49 a director of music ministry,
In a few cases, the question
1
university25 to fall within the exception.
(compared to an administrative
of who can be considered a "minister"
of the role religion played in a
worker) hinged on a determination 25 2
Yet for the most part, courts
decision to terminate an employee.
a church-minister relation2 53
have not required a religious element-if
adjudicating the dispute.
from
refrain
courts
ship is implicated,
receives protection outside the
The church-minister relationship
over the extent of that the proTitle VII context, but courts are split
overwhelmingly rejected claims of
tection. For example, courts have
2 54 Courtsjustify such decisions by concluding that
clergy malpractice.

that
F.2d 477, 485 (5th Cir. 1980) (suggesting
247 CompareEEOC v. Miss. Coll., 626
congregaits
and
church
a
between
ministers include those who are "intermediaries [or] instruct students in the whole
faithful
the
of
needs
religious
to
tion" who "attend
that a
772 F.2d at 1169 (stating more broadly
is
of religious doctrine"), with Rayburn,
position
a
"whether
of
hinges on the question
determination of who is a minister
note
supra
Bagni,
and
church"),
mission of the
important to the spiritual and pastoral
whose "primary duties consist of teaching,
those
as
ministers
164, at 1545 (defining
supervisupervision of a religious order, or
spreading the faith, church governance,
ritual or worship").
sion or participation in religious
1653.
at
32,
note
248 See Brady, supra
704.
at
F.3d
320
249 Alicea-Hernandez,
Cir.
of Raleigh, 213 F.3d 795, 805 (4th
Diocese
Catholic
Roman
v.
EEOC
250
2000).
at 457.
251 Catholic Univ. of Am., 83 F.3d
U.S.
v. Dayton Christian Schs., Inc., 477
Comm'n
Rights
Civil
Ohio
e.g.,
252 See,
constitutional
no
administrative board "violates
if
619, 628 (1986) (stating that a state
of [an employee's] discharge ...
circumstances
the
rights by merely investigating
reason
the
religious-based reason was in fact
only to ascertain whether the ascribed
F.3d 940, 947
196
Jesus,
of
Soc'y
the
of
Province
for the discharge"); Bollard v. Cal.
of any
the ministerial exception in the absence
(9th Cir. 1999) (declining to apply
851
840,
A.2d
800
Pierce,
v.
McKelvey
"religious justification for the harassment");
against excesshield
a
provides
doctrine
autonomy
(N.J. 2002) ("Although the church
where 'the
is implicated only in those situations
[it]
.
.
.
incursion
sive government
Church
Episcopal
v.
belief.'" (quoting Bryce
alleged misconduct is rooted in religious
2002))).
Cir.
648, 657 (10th
in the Diocese of Colo., 289 F.3d
of Seventh-Day Adventists, 772 F.2d 1164,
Conference
Gen.
v.
253 See Rayburn
religious' matters, the free
"'quintessentially
in
1169 (4th Cir. 1985) (holding that
behind it"
of a decision rather than a motivation
exercise clause . . . protects the act
426 U.S.
Milivojevich,
v.
Diocese
E. Orthodox
(citation omitted) (quoting Serbian
696, 720 (1976))).
clergy
913 S.W.2d 761, 767 (Ark. 1996) (holding
254 See, e.g., Cherepski v. Walker,
948,
P.2d
763
Nally v. Grace Cmty. Church,
malpractice was not a cognizable claim);
from
resulted
allegedly
suicide
a
claim where
961 (Cal. 1998) (rejecting a malpractice
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the application of a neutral principle of law-determining the appropriate standard of conduct for a religious leader-necessarily requires
an inquiry into religious principles. 255 Churches have also enjoyed
protection from defamation claims arising out of church communications2 56 and in lawsuits governing a breach of an employment
257
contract.
However, some courts express reluctance to protect church
autonomy when the church-minister relationship can be regulated by
statute and does not interfere with either of the two other spheres of
church autonomy. For example, many courts conclude that some
aspects of the church-minister relationship can be regulated, including whether a fired minister can receive unemployment benefits, 258
whether ministers may organize under state collective bargaining
laws, 259 whether religious employees are empowered to receive broad
insurance coverage,2 60 and whether supervisors can be found liable
failed religious counseling); Mabus v. St. James Episcopal Church, 884 So. 2d 747,
763-64 (Miss. 2004) (finding that clergy malpractice claims would "excessively entangle" the court with religious tenets); Schieffer v. Catholic Archdiocese, 508 N.W.2d
907, 912 (Neb. 1993) (acknowledging the "constitutional difficulties" in adjudicating
a clergy malpractice claim); In re Pleasant Glade Assembly of God, 991 S.W.2d 85,
89-90 (Tex. App. 1998) (finding that the First Amendment barred inquiry into the
proper application of church doctrine). But see Odenthal v. Minn. Conference of
Seventh-Day Adventists, 649 N.W.2d 426, 438-41 (Minn. 2002) (holding that a negligence claim can proceed based on neutral legal principles provided by statute).
Some courts have distinguished breach of fiduciary duty from clergy malpractice, and
found courts can adjudicate the former because "the former is a breach of trust and
does not require a professional relationship or a professional standard of care, while
the latter is an action for negligence based on a professional relationship and a professional standard of care." Moses v. Diocese of Colo., 863 P.2d 310, 321 n.13 (Colo.
1993).
255 Nally, 763 P.2d at 960 (reasoning that defining a standard of care for clergy
malpractice "would necessarily be intertwined with the religious philosophy of the
particular denomination or ecclesiastical teachings of the religious entity").
256 E.g., Klagsbrun v. Va'ad Harabonim of Greater Monsey, 53 F. Supp. 2d 732,
742 (D.NJ. 1999), aff'd, 263 F.3d 158 (3d Cir. 2001); Se. Conference Ass'n of SeventhDay Adventists, Inc. v. Dennis, 862 So. 2d 842, 843-44 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003);
Downs v. Roman Catholic Archbishop of Bat., 683 A.2d 808, 811-13 (Md. Ct. Spec.
App. 1996); Patton v. Jones, No. 03-04-00389-CV, 2006 WL 2082974, at *3-4 (Tex.
App. July 28, 2006).
257 See Goodman v. Temple Shir Ami, Inc., 712 So. 2d 775, 777 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1998) ("Inquiring into the adequacy of the religious reasoning behind the dismissal
of a spiritual leader is not a proper task for a civil court.").
258 See Newport Church of the Nazarene v. Hensley, 56 P.3d 386, 394 (Or. 2002).
259 See S. Jersey Catholic Sch. Teachers Org. v. St. Teresa of the Infant Jesus
Church Elementary Sch., 696 A.2d 709, 723-24 (N.J. 1997).
260 See Catholic Charities of the Diocese of Albany v. Serio, 859 N.E.2d 459, 465
(N.Y. 2006) ("The existence of a limited exemption for ministers from antidiscrimina-
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26 1
Ultimately, determining the
for negligence in clergy abuse cases.
relationship should be protected
extent to which the church-minister
far exceeds the scope of this Note.
by the church autonomy doctrine
to the church-minister relationIt suffices to say that when it comes
protection to hire and fire
ship, churches generally enjoy complete
less discretion in other contexts if
ministers but exercise considerably
been defined by statute.
the applicable standard of care has

D.

Possible Exceptions to These Spheres

autonomy often overlap
The aforementioned spheres of religious
the neutral principles of law
as they prohibit courts from applying
in Supreme Court opinions sugapproach. However, some language
these spheres is not absolute. The
gests the protection provided by
of church tribunals must be
Court said in Gonzalez that decisions collusion, or arbitrariness. 2 2
of fraud,
deferred to "[iln the absence
on the "arbitrariness" language in
The Illinois Supreme Court seized
Orthodox Church had arbi2653 The
Milivojevich, concluding that the Serbian
should be defrocked.
bishop
a
that
determined
trarily
that such actions involved imperSupreme Court reversed, holding
doctrine 264 :
missible interpretation of religious
the ecclesiastical actions of a
For civil courts to analyze whether
inherently

"arbitrary" must
church judicatory are in that sense
canon or ecclesiastical law
entail inquiry into the procedures that
to follow, or else into the
supposedly requires the church judicatory
to decide the
supposedly
substantive criteria by which they are the inquiry that the First
ecclesiastical question. But this is exactly
undermines the general rule
Amendment prohibits... [because it
decisions of church
that] a civil court must accept the ecclesiastical
tribunals as it finds them.

265

right for a religiously affiliated employer
tion laws does not translate into an absolute
employees in conformity with church

with its
to structure all aspects of its relationship
teachings.").
Catholic
So. 2d 347, 360-64 (Fla. 2002); Roman
261 See, e.g., Malicki v. Doe, 814
So. 2d 1213, 1241-42 (Miss. 2005).
Diocese of Jackson v. Morrison, 905
280 U.S. 1, 16 (1929).
262
263
1975),
264
265

Archbishop,
Gonzalez v. Roman Catholic
281-82 (111.
v. Milivojevich, 328 N.E.2d 268,
Church
See Serbian E. Orthodox
rev'd, 426 U.S. 696 (1976).
Milivojevich, 426 U.S. at 721-23.
Id. at 713.
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With the arbitrariness exception thus prohibited, it is unclear to
what extent the other perceived prohibitions might exist. 2 66

For

example, a court struggles to apply the fraud exception without involving itself in a religious inquiry. The essence of a fraud claim is a material misrepresentation, and the process of determining whether a
misrepresentation occurred would necessarily require a court to
determine the content of religious doctrine. 267 In any event, no court
has relied on the language of Gonzalez to evaluate and interpret religious doctrine in cases of fraud or collusion.
IV.

EXTERNAL PROTECTIONS FOR CHURCH AUTONOMY

This proposed framework for applying the church autonomy doctrine already has several inherent protections for church autonomy.
First, before a court presumes it can apply a "neutral principle of law,"
it must first determine whether that "principle of law" is in fact neutral. Under the Court's neutrality definition, a court can apply a principle of law if it does not target beliefs or restrict religious practices
purely because of their religious quality.2 6

Second, a church can

rebut this presumption and protect its autonomy by proving that the
application of the neutral principle of law interferes with one of the
three aforementioned constitutionally protected spheres of
autonomy.

This framework does not address the entire universe of protection for religious-group autonomy. In addition to the protections
already built into this framework for fixing the church autonomy doctrine, the Smith Court provided two external methods by which religious institutions can protect church autonomy. First, Smith hinted
that other constitutional provisions might adequately protect individual religious practices. 269 Second, Smith noted that when other constitutional protections do not exist, legislatures could step in to create
religious-based exemptions. 270 In the church autonomy context, the
266 Then-Justice Rehnquist apparently believed that the provisions survived. See
Gen. Council on Fin. & Admin., v. Cal. Super. Ct., 439 U.S 1369, 1372-73 (1978)
(Rehnquist, Circuit J.).
267 See Paul Horwitz, Scientology in Court: A Comparative Analysis and Some Thoughts
on Selected Issues in Law and Religion, 47 DEPAUL L. REv. 85, 143-50 (1997).
268 See Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 533
(1993); see also supra notes 175-80 and accompanying text (exploring the connection
between the Lukumi Babalu standard of neutral laws and court-defined neutral

principles).
269 See Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 881-82 (1990).
270 See id. at 890.
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successful at protecting the values
latter method has proven far more
protection of church autonomy.
espoused by those who favor broad
theoretically provide alterWhile other constitutional provisions
7 courts are relatively hostile to such
native sources of protection,2 l
rejecting a church autonomy
arguments. For example, lower courts
the Free Exercise Clause or
defense frequently also consider whether
2 72 Many statutes that
violated.
the Establishment Clause has been
and "religious" activity for
attempt to distinguish between "secular"
may conflict with the Establishthe purposes of creating exemptions
if a
2 73 Likewise, free exercise problems may develop
ment Clause.
interfere with a church's religious
state passes laws that impermissibly
yet
274 No court has rejected a church autonomy defense,
activities.
Religion
under either of the
held government action unconstitutional
Religion
2 75 It accordingly remains unclear how much the
Clauses.
See id. at 881-82.
1213,
of Jackson v. Morrison, 905 So. 2d
272 See, e.g., Roman Catholic Diocese
church
the
that
believes
one
if
is stronger
1224-37 (Miss. 2005). This argument
strength from both the Religion Clauses.
constitutional
its
draws
doctrine
autonomy
See supra note 62.
text (providing guidelines for draft273 Cf infra notes 302-04 and accompanying
activities from certain laws).
ing statutes designed to exempt religious
exercise
"a State would be 'prohibiting the free
274 As the Supreme Court has said,
engaged
are
they
acts or abstentions only when
[of religion]' if it sought to ban such
of the religious belief that they display."
because
only
or
in for religious reasons,
under
original). Professor McConnell suggests,
Smith, 494 U.S. at 877 (alterations in
a religious exemption, that
a view that the Constitution never requires
challenge facially neutral legislacannot
religious believers and institutions
on their ability or freedom to practice
tion, no matter what effect it may have
that all witnesses must testify to
their religious faith. Thus, a requirement
on a criminal prosecution ... if applied
facts within their knowledge bearing
confidentiality of the confessional.
the
without exception, could abrogate
consumption could make the
alcohol
on
Similarly, a general prohibition
uniform regulation of meat prepChristian sacrament of communion illegal,
out of business, and prohibitions
aration could put kosher slaughterhouses
status could end the male
marital
or
of discrimination on the basis of sex
celibate priesthood.
of ReligHistorical Understandingof Free Exercise
Michael W. McConnell, The Origins and
passage
McConnell's
cite
(1990). Courts that
ion, 103 HARV. L. Rrv. 1409, 1418-19
be "well beyond the bounds of constitutional
to
laws"
often label such "hypothetical
of Albany v. Serio, 859 N.E.2d 459,
acceptability." Catholic Charities of the Diocese
do not pass such sweeping laws
legislatures
that
467 (N.Y. 2006). The mere fact
Religion Clauses provide.
implicitly speaks to the protection the
of
conduct is that when faced with a violation
275 One possible explanation for this
the
given
defense
ignore a church autonomy
the First Amendment, a court will simply
doctrine.
the
murky state of
271
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Clauses independently protect church autonomy when the doctrine
itself fails.
Smith also noted that the only instances where a neutral, generally applicable law did not apply to religiously motivated conduct
involved the application of the Free Exercise Clause in connection
with some other constitutional protection. 76 Although commentators have largely scoffed at these so-called hybrid constitutional
rights,2 7 7 at least one court has relied on this language in Smith to
excuse a church from liability.2 78 Finally, Smith suggested that religious individuals could bring suits seeking to protect their free association rights on grounds informed by First Amendment principles.2 79
However, no religious organization has specifically relied on this passage in Smith to successfully protect some aspect of church autonomy.
Second, Smith declared that legislatures, not courts, should create
individual-based exemptions to generally applicable laws. 28 0 Admit-

tedly, a clear constitutional rule established by courts generally protects a constitutional right better than trusting a legislature to protect

276 Smith, 494 U.S. at 881-82.
277 In Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 (1992),
Justice Souter attacked the concept of hybrid rights as "ultimately untenable," writing:
If a hybrid claim is simply one in which another constitutional right is implicated, then the hybrid exception would probably be so vast as to swallow the
Smith rule, and, indeed, the hybrid exception would cover the situation
exemplified by Smith, since free speech and associational rights are certainly
implicated in the peyote ritual. But if a hybrid claim is one in which a litigant would actually obtain an exemption from a formally neutral, generally
applicable law under another constitutional provision, then there would
have been no reason for the Court in what Smith calls the hybrid cases to
have mentioned the Free Exercise Clause at all.
Id at 567 (Souter, J., concurring); see also Steven H. Aden & Lee J. Strang, Wen a
"Rule" Doesn't Rule: The Failure of the Oregon Employment Division v. Smith "Hybrid
Rights Exception ", 108 PENN ST. L. Rev. 573, 587-609 (2003) (chronicling the lack of
success of hybrid rights challenges following Smith); Carol M. Kaplan, Note, The Devil
Is in the Details: Neutral, Generally Applicable Laws and Exceptionsfrom Smith, 75 N.Y.U. L.
REv. 1045, 1060-73 (2000) (exploring how Smith's hybrid rights discussion has confused lower courts).
278 See Brazauskas v. Fort Wayne-South Bend Diocese, Inc., 796 N.E.2d 286, 293
(Ind. 2003). But see id. at 294-96 (Sullivan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part) (questioning whether the church autonomy doctrine survived Smith and suggesting that even if it did, neutral principles could be applied to adjudicate the case at
hand because neither party suggested that the position at issue would have involved
ministerial-type duties).
279 See Smith, 494 U.S. at 882.
280 See id. at 890.
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281 As a practical matter, however, legislatures have
that same right.
a plethora of exemptions.
not hesitated to grant religious institutions
exempchurches enjoy numerous
28 3 and disIn the United States Code alone,
28 2
age-based
laws,
28 5 land
tions from otherwise generally applicable
28 4
kinds of tax laws,
certain
laws,
discrimination
ability-based
28 7 labor laws, 28 8 and fair housing
28 6
gambling laws,
use regulations,'
that since 1989, "more than 200
9
laws.28 In fact, one study concluded
or exemptions for religious groups
special arrangements, protections,
2 90
Indeed, the probin federal law.
or their adherents" were codified
too few exemptions; the proliferation
lem is not that churches receive
at the federal, state, and local
of these religious-based exemptions
2 9 1 The same concerns about placing
levels has drawn some criticism.

political prothat leaving accommodation to the
281 See id. ("It may fairly be said
widely
those religious practices that are not
cess will place at a relative disadvantage
Amendment
First
J., concurring) ("[T]he
engaged in .... "); id. at 902 (O'Connor,
are not
of those whose religious practices
rights
the
was enacted precisely to protect
hostility.").
be viewed with
shared by the majority and may
Bishop of the
see also Corp. of the Presiding
(2000);
2000e-l
§
282 42 U.S.C.
(1987)
329-30
327,
Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S.
Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day
Clause).
the Establishment
(holding that § 2000e-1 does not violate
the
106-07, 109 (2d Cir. 2006). In Hankins,
96,
F.3d
441
283 See Hankins v. Lyght,
§ 3, 42 U.S.C.
1993
of
Act
Restoration
Freedom
in
court concluded that the Religious
exemption to the Age Discrimination
religious-based
a
out
carved
§ 2000bb-1,
§§ 621-634. Id.
Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C.
284 42 U.S.C. § 12187.
other nonchurches in the list of charitable and
285 I.R.C. § 501 (c) (3) (including
Swaggart
for tax-exempt status). But see Jimmy
profit corporations that can qualify
religiousthat
493 U.S. 378, 392 (1990) (holding
Ministries v. Bd. of Equalization,
religious
selling
when
tax
applicable sales
based organizations must pay a generally
materials).
Persons Act (RLUIPA) of 2000
286 Religious Land Use and Institutionalized
§ 2(a) (1), 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc(a) (l).
287 18 U.S.C. § 1955(e).
(construing
of Chi., 440 U.S. 490, 504-07 (1979)
288 Cf NLRB v. Catholic Bishop
schools
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151-169,
U.S.C. §§
the National Labor Relations Act, 29
from compliance with the Act).
289 42 U.S.C. § 3607(a).
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Trumps Regulation as Legal Exemptions
290 Diana B. Henriques, Religion
TiMEs, Oct. 8, 2006, § 1, at 1.
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Religious Programs Expand, Disputes
291 See Diana B. Henriques, As
Diana B.
Al (discussing property tax exemptions);
Breaks, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 10, 2006, at
Oct. 11,
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responsibility for the creation of individual religious exemptions in
the political process perceived in Smith apply with equal force in the
context of religious groups: "[L] eaving accommodation to the political process will place at a relative disadvantage those religious prac292
tices that are not widely engaged in."
However, giving legislatures, and not courts, the responsibility to
create these religious-based exemptions correctly acknowledges that
legislatures are better equipped to determine the proper scope of
these protections.2 93 For example, the New York State Assembly struggled to define who was a "religious employer" for purposes of determining who could claim they were exempt from a requirement to
provide insurance coverage for contraceptive methods. 294 One
option would define a religious employer as any "'group or entity...
supervised or controlled by or in connection with a religious organization or denominational group or entity."' 2 9 5 A second and narrower
definition required prospective religious employers to satisfy a fourprong test.2 96 Based on extensive analysis of the issue, and after hearing significant testimony from both sides, the legislature ultimately
adopted the narrower definition. 2 97 By contrast, a court decision on
such an important policy matter could only be based on the facts and
298
views of the parties to the dispute.
In crafting these statutory exemptions, legislatures should keep in
mind two drafting principles. First, when faced with a decision about
whether a legislature meant to apply a neutral, generally applicable
law to a religious organization, courts will construe an ambiguous statute to exclude the religious organization. The seminal case is NLRB
v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago,299 where the Supreme Court concluded
Congress did not intend for the National Labor Relations Act to apply
tors' Reach, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 20, 2006, at CI (describing what some state officials call
.unregulated health insurance"); Diana B. Henriques, Where Faith Abides, Employees
Have Few Rights, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 9, 2006, at Al (exploring the ministerial exception).
292 Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 890 (1990).
293 See Hamilton, supra note 39, at 1193-96.
294 N.Y. INS. LAW § 3221()(16)(A) (McKinney 2006).
295 Catholic Charities of the Diocese of Albany v. Serio, 859 N.E.2d 459, 462 (N.Y.
2006) (quoting S.B. 3, § 14, 2001-02 Reg. Leg., 224th Sess. (N.Y. 2001)).
296 See id. at 461 (quoting N.Y. INS. LAw § 3221(l) (16) (A) (1)).
297 See id. at 461-62; cf. Hamilton, supranote 39, at 1195 (noting how a legislature
"brings better tools to assess the exemption options than a court has available"
because "[i]t can study the issue from many angles, from listening to constituents to
using hearings, experts, and appointed commissions").
298 See Hamilton, supra note 39, at 1196.
299 440 U.S. 490 (1979).
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to teachers in religious schools.3 0 0 However, other courts more readily concluded that legislatures intended labor laws to cover religious
employers.30 1 Second, when defining what entities qualify for exemptions, legislatures should carefully craft such statutory exemptions in
light of existing Establishment Clause jurisprudence. The Supreme
Court has clearly recognized that "it is a permissible legislative purpose to alleviate significant governmental interference with the ability
of religious organizations to define and carry out their religious missions. '' 3°2 But while legislative bodies can use the word "religion" in
statutes, they should avoid defining the scope of the religious conduct
with particularity. Laws and regulations can exempt certain religious
activities and not others, 303 but they cannot create so-called religious
30 4
tests.

300 Id. at 507 ("[I]n the absence of a clear expression of Congress' intent ... we
decline to construe the Act in a manner that could in turn call upon the Court to
resolve difficult and sensitive questions arising out of the guarantees of the First
Amendment Religion Clauses.").
301 Eg., S. Jersey Catholic Sch. Teachers Org. v. St. Teresa of the Infant Jesus
Church Elementary Sch., 696 A.2d 709, 713-14 (N.J. 1997) (concluding that the New
Jersey Constitution was meant to cover workers not protected by the National Labor
Relations Act, and therefore included the employees of a religious school). Unlike in
Catholic Bishop, where the Supreme Court "avoided the constitutional claims that were
asserted," id. at 714, the Supreme Court of New Jersey ultimately concluded that the
state constitution did not violate the First Amendment. Id. at 714-24.
302 Corp. of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day
Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 335 (1987).
303 See Catholic Charities of Sacramento, Inc. v. Superior Court, 85 P.3d 67, 76-95
(Cal. 2004); Catholic Charities of the Diocese of Albany v. Serio, 859 N.E.2d 459, 464
(N.Y. 2006). The law at issue in both cases exempted religious entities for whom "the
inculcation of religious values is the purpose of the entity," "[tlbe entity primarily
employs persons who share the religious tenets of the entity," "Itjhe entity serves primarily persons who share the religious tenets of the entity," and the "entity is a nonprofit organization" as defined by the Internal Revenue Service. CAL. HEALTH &
SA+ETY CODE § 1367.25(b) (1) (West 2000); see also N.Y. INS. LAw § 3221(l) (16) (A) (1)
(McKinney 2006) (containing identical language to the California statute).
304 See, e.g., Espinosa v. Rusk, 634 F.2d 477,481-82 (10th Cir. 1980), affd, 456 U.S.
951 (1982). In Espinosa, the court struck down a local ordinance that required organizations to obtain a permit to conduct a solicitation drive. The ordinance exempted
.religious" activities, which included solicitations by religious groups "solely for 'evangelical, missionary or religious but not secular purposes.'" Id. at 479 (quoting local
ordinance at issue). The ordinance also defined secular as " ' not spiritual or ecclesiastical, but rather relating to affairs of the present world, such as providing food, clothing, and counseling." Id. (quoting local ordinance at issue). As the court said, the
attempt to define "that which is religious and that which is secular" is "necessarily a
suspect effort." Id. at 481.
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CONCLUSION

Religious organizations serve a valuable function in society.
Those who have argued for an expansive right to church autonomy,
free from government regulation except in the most extreme cases,
point to the intrinsic value of strong church independence and the
resulting need for a deferential doctrine of religious group autonomy.3 15 As a normative matter, such views have merit. However, from
a historical and precedential perspective, and in light of the practical
problems with applying the church autonomy doctrine, those broad
claims are misplaced.
After Jones, courts need not extend absolute deference to religious organizations as a constitutional matter. However, they have
struggled to consistently determine when the application of neutral
principles of law constitutes unconstitutional interference with the
internal affairs of a church. In light of demonstrated judicial incompetence to make such decisions on a case-by-case basis, the historical
attitude toward religious groups evident at the time of the Founding,
and the First Amendment principles announced in Smith, courts
should simply presume they can properly apply neutral principles of
law. It makes no difference whether the common law or statutory provisions provide the applicable neutral principle.
All is not lost for those seeking strong protection for the internal
affairs of a church. Under this Note's framework for evaluating a
church autonomy claim, churches could rebut this general presumption by showing how government action interferes with one of three
constitutionally protected spheres of autonomy. First, the government cannot infringe upon the power of a church to declare how it
will worship or interpret its own religious doctrine. Second, the government cannot interfere with the power of a church to make broad
structural decisions or adjudicate other internal religious disputes
regarding which faction of a church has the power to govern. Third,
the government cannot interfere with the power of a church to hire
and fire its ministers, and other aspects of the church-minister relationship may also lie beyond the power of the government. Even if
305 See Kathleen A. Brady, Religious Organizations and Mandatory Collective Bargaining Under Federaland State Labor Laws: Freedom From and FreedomFor, 49 VILL. L. REv. 77,
167 (2004) (suggesting that broad freedom from government interference enables
religious organizations to "preserve [e) new visions of social life for us all"); Garnett,
supranote 147, at 82 (arguing that broad religious freedom is important "for the role
that it plays not only in securing religious freedom and pluralism under constitutionally limited government, but in facilitating the development and flourishing of
persons").
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the church autonomy doctrine does not provide adequate protection,
or when courts err about the degree of impermissible intervention
that may occur, other constitutional provisions and legislative action
might defend church autonomy.
While the church autonomy doctrine generally serves a normative good by providing limited protection for religious freedom, religious institutions cannot escape liability for their actions as a
constitutional matter insofar as government entities can regulate their
conduct by neutral principles of law. This framework, corrects the
problems inherent in case-by-case application of the church autonomy
doctrine and, like Smith, imposes burdens upon church autonomy
rather than extend religious institutions carte blanche to do as they
please. Furthermore, Smith establishes that courts-and by extension,
the Constitution-have little to say when it comes to constructing
religious exemptions from generally applicable laws. Instead, as the
Court correctly noted and as this framework entails, the proper entity
for granting additional religious-based exemptions "shall be the
people .

306

30 6

City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 544 (1997) (Scalia, J., concurring).

